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MARINE REVIEW. Entered at Cleveland Post Office as Second-class Mail Matter. Published every Thursday at 418-19 Perry- Payne Bldg., by the Marine Review Pub. Co. VoL; ~ XE. CLEVELAND, O.,,APRIL 19, 1900, Foreign $3.50 a Year. No. 16 REVERSED THE LOCALS. SUPERVISING INSPEOTOR SLOANE EXONERATES CAPT. W. J. HUNT OF THE ROOKE- FELLER STEAMER NEILSON FROM FAULT OF ANY KIND IN CONNECTION WITH THE SINKING OF THE TUG RECORD AT DULUTH. Lake vesselmen will remember that in December last the local steam- boat inspectors at Duluth, Messrs. Monaghan and Chalk, suspended for a year the license of Capt. W. J. Hunt of the Rockefeller steamer Neilson, on account of the sinking of a tug in Duluth-Superior harbor. The case was one of general interest, as steamboat captains to whom the facts were submitted were all of the opinion that a mistake had ibeen made in taking Capt. Hunt's license from him. 'Hon. John D. Sloane of Dubuque, Ia., supervising inspector of the fifth district, has now reversed the ruling of the Duluth inspectors. His letter on the subject to Messrs. Monaghan and Chalk, dated the 9th inst., goes into the case fully and is as follows: - "On Dee. 12, 1899, you. suspended the license of Capt. William J. Hunt for a period of one year, commencing Dec. 12, 1899, and ending Dee. 11, 1900, for alleged violation of that portion of Rule VI which refers to vessels being navigated in crowded channels or the vicinity of wharves with great caution. It appears that on the date of the alleged violation the steamer James B. Neilson entered the harbor at Duluth, Capt. 'W. J. Hunt in command, and was being assisted to her dock by the tug Record, Capt. Wm. C. Burnett in command. That when the vessels had arrived at a point about 3,700 feet past the bend, or about opposite the new ele- vator, the Neilson ran up on the stern of the Record, rolling her down so that she filled and sank. It is claimed by witnesses on the tug that the steamer Neilson was being navigated at an excessive rate of speed, esti- mated at 11 miles an hour, but the witnesses of the Neilson claim she was not running to exceed 5 miles an hour at the time the accident occurred. "Under date of Dec. 10, 1899, I received from Capt. Wm. J. Hunt notice of appeal from the decision of the local board at Duluth; also a communication wherein he expressed himself as being satisfied with the manner in which the investigation was conducted by you, that he had no additional testimony to offer, and that he would abide by any decision I might arrive at, based upon the testimony submitted. On April 7, 1900, I visited Duluth and examined Mr. R. F. Barrows in the engine-room of the tug Record, in the presence of Capt. William J. Hunt and William C. Burnett, and it was practically demonstrated by the evidence that it was impossible for Mr. Barrows, the engineer, while on his knees in the act of oiling the machinery to even reach the lever when the throttle valve was open to its full capacity. "After a careful examination of the testimony I find that Capt. William J. Hunt, of the steamer James D. Neilson, exercised due precaution by stationing himself on the top of the pilot house, the mate on the forward turret, which position gave him an unobstructed view of the harbor and its surroundings. The captain asserts that the rate of speed of the Neil- son did not exceed 5 miles an hour at the time of the collision. This statement is corroborated by the mate, wheelsman and chief engineer. The time of leaving the piers, as shown by the log of the Neilson, was 5:20 a. m., and the time of the accident 5:45 a. m., and the distance as given on United States engineers' map of Nov. 17, 1899, is 8,970 feet, or 1.69 miles from piers to point where accident occurred, so that the average rate of speed was 4.05 miles an hour. In addition, the captain, wheels- man, 'chief engineer and oiler of the steamer Neilson, who were on watch, all swear that the rate of speed was not increased after entering the harbor. "The after ballast tank only being filled, leaving three empty, de- pressed the stern of the Neilson, which resulted in elevating the steamer's high and protruding overhang, peculiar to this type of vessel (whaleback) at the end, to a distance above the water variously estimated by Capt. Hunt and by Capt. Burnett at 18 to 25 feet, being at least 15 feet above the deck or stern of the Record. Under these conditions, Capt. Hunt swears he was unable to see the Record from his station on top of the pilot house. The mate also states that the position of the Record was not visible and that he could not see the Record when dead-ahead; also asserts that the Record dropped back under the bow of the Neilson 40 feet; when he dis- covered the position of the tug, he immediately passed word to the captain to go slow and give her a turn back, and from the movement of the boat the engines must have been reversed. The statements of the engineer and oiler show that the engines were stopped and backed strong, about five or six revolutions. At no time was the Neilson signaled to check her speed. Capt. Burnett of the tug Record states that the Neilson was increasing her speed from the time she passed the Ohio coal dock to time of accident; consequently it was necessary for him to increase his speed in order to keep out of the way of the Neilson. The distance from the Ohio coal dock to the point where the accident occurred is 3,700 feet, taken from United States engineers' map, or 7/10 of a mile. At a constant rate of speed of 11 miles an hour, the time required to make this distance would be 3.81 minutes, time sufficient to have either checked the speed of the Neilson, or to have 'dropped back with the line dragging,' which man- euver Capt. Burnett contemplated executing if the Neilson ignored the signal to check in passing a dredge in the channel. Instead of giving the Neilson a check signal, or throwing his wheel hard over one way or the other, avoiding the direct course of the Neilson, and again shifting the wheel to bring the tug parallel to and outside of the path of the steamer, which action would have obviated the danger, Capt. Burnett made no effort whatever to determine the position of the Neilson. Said action can only be justified by the fact that he did not consider the rate of speed at all dangerous. He admits that there was an unobstructed view from the pilot house of the tug Record aft; that he could not see over the bow or forward turret of the Neilson; that the captain of the Neilson would not be able to see the tug if he stood in the center of the pilot house (pilot house of the Neilson estimated to be 10 to 12. feet athwartships and 250 to 280 feet aft); that he did not even look aft to ascertain the position of the steamer or to locate the captain; that he knew it was his privilege to check the steamer by signals or whistles, and that, in fact, it was his in- tention to do so, on account of a dredge some distance ahead, which they were not allowed to pass at a speed exceeding six miles per hour. Quot- ing his exact words: - 'I intended to check her down, and if the steamboat would not check down I would have dropped back with the line dragging so as to show the man on the dredge I was not to blame'; and further that the engines were being operated to their full capacity, throttle valve wide open, the speed of tug being about 11 miles an hour, which statement is corroborated by the engineer. I am of the opinion that had the throttle been open to its fullest capacity at any time, Capt. Burnett's attention would have been directed to it, as was that of the mate of the Neilson, who noticed the tug's exhaust suddenly increase in intensity, and in look- ing over the bow of the Neilson saw the tug under the bow, demonstrating the fact that the throttle was not opened wide until the engineer, who was on his knees in the engine room oiling the machinery, felt the shock of the collision, the first indication to those on the Record that the line was slack. He immediately sprung to his feet, looked out and discovered that the Neilson had lapped on the stern of the Record. Engineer R. F. Bar- rows of the tug Record in his examination before you on Oct. 10, 1899, positively asserted: 'When I was on my knees I had my hand on the throttle and she was wide open and working all right... On April 7, 1900, Mr. Barrows swore that it was impossible for him to reach the throttle when same was wide open and he on his knees, which latter evidence is corroborated in a conclusive manner by the experiment relative thereto mentioned in a former part of this report. "The only person connected with the tug who watched the tow line (50 feet in length) was the engineer on watch. He also admits it is the privilege of the tug man to blow check whistles to the steamboat in tow, and in addition considers the whaleback the most dangerous type of steamer to. handle. If the speed was the cause of the accident Capt. Burnett was, in my opinion, entirely at fault for not even attempting to control, as he asserts, excessive speed, of which the tug master is supposed to be the judge, such being the practice by an unwritten common law in vogue ever since the use of tugs in this capacity became prevalent on the great lakes; but in my opinion the accident was not caused by excessive speed, but was caused by the throttle valve closing automatically while the engineer was on his knees oiling the machinery, permitting the Record to drop back under the bow of the Neilson. "From the evidence submitted I fail to discover wherein Capt. Wm. J. Hunt is guilty of violating any of the laws, rules or regulations governing navigation, and I therefore reverse your decision by which the license of William J. Hunt as master and pilot was suspended for a period of one year, commencing Dec. 12, 1899, and ending Dec. 11, 1900." LAKE FREIGHT OUTLOOK. With the advance ships of the lake fleet moving through the Straits of Mackinaw, and all indications pointing to a general opening of naviga- tion within a week it can truthfully be said that the situation now as to lake freights is just as it was in October last, when all vessel capacity that could possibly be secured at $1.25 a ton from the head of Lake Superior was taken for the ore trade, which is the greatest item in lake commerce and upon which other rates are based. 'There is still more ore to be had at this same rate from the head of the lakes, and no indication of any change in the plans that have been made for a movement of freight far exceeding all records of previous years in lake commerce. All this not- withstanding the setback that has taken place in iron and steel lines, which it must be admitted is not an encouraging feature in the general business outlook, 'Within the past day or two a few charters for first trips with ore from Escanaba have been made at 90 cents, which is 10 cents below the contract rate, but this is not taken as an indication of weakness in freights, as it has been understood from the beginning that Escanaba shippers were more fully provided with contract vessels than the shippers who move ore from the head of the lakes. A few additions are again made this year to the list of big steamship companies that carry no insurance. It is understood that there will be no insurance of any kind on the fleet of some fifty vessels owned by John D. Rockefeller. The great bulk of the hull business that has been closed has been at rates about equal to last year. About the only change of impor- tance has been a marked increase in the insurance valuations placed upon the vessels, which is, of course, to the advantage of the insurance com- panies. The English companies--they have again taken the great bulk of © the business and mainly through the Prime-McCurdy interests of Chicago --have insisted upon a valuation of £5 per gross ton on steel vessels. In the transfer of Dry Tortugas to the navy there is established the first fortified naval base under the exclusive control of the navy. depart- ment. The marine hospital service endeavored to gain possession of it for quarantine purposes but the president held that it was too important strategetically to be surrendered. The transfer to the navy also establishes a precedent which may be far reaching. It has been a mooted question with various nations as to whether coast defences are an adjunct of the army or navy. 'This would imply that as far as the United States is con- cerned they are within the jurisdiction of the navy department. The issue of the superimposed turret seems to be settled--at least for the present, There will be no double turrets 'built. As no nation has adopted the superimposed turret hitherto this seems quite a natural thing to do. These turrets should be first tested before their adoption becomes general--and actual conflict seems to be the only satisfactory method of testing their military efficiency.