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20 are two generally adopted nection and these are finder and a teléscope. As to the last named it is difficult to understand why the Fiske telescope has not been adopted. It has been reported on favorably by. a number of boards and the necessity of a mechanical, mounted, powerful telescope is self evident. As to methods of signaling, some progress has been made. 'The wireless has come to stay, and wireless telephones are on the way. The two arm semaplfore machines have been adopted, but they are unnecessarily heavy. No one method of others. As stated in the paper 12 years ago, "No method of signaling is per se the best. The squadron (fleet) which has all methods of signaling has the advantage. Where there is need to signal in action, the need is pressing. Of course it is sought, in all battle tactics, to reduce 'the necessity for signaling to a minimum; but through the shifting conditions of smoke, noise, wind, distance, and accident to various methods, the resources for making the few simple battle signals should be, all that modern ingenuity can devise." It is a curious thing that only in the last few weeks has this idea finally received official recogni- "tion. We have all along apparently held to the idea that flag signals were the only ones we could use in battle, for no provision has heretofore been made for quickly transmit- ting the same signals by other means than flags. Fortunately this incomprehensible con- servatism has given way to a broad and full recognition of the principle that every method of transmiting battle signals must be devel- oped to its fullest possibility.. "One code for all purposes of signaling, and every possible method of transmitting that one code.' We have lost 12 years in doing it, but it means for tactics all that the recent chance in gun- nery methods have done for battle efficiency as regards our ships' batteries. III. tacrics--Homogeneity of battleships in a fleet is tactically ideal and practically un- attainable as the units are designed at different times, by -different people, and on different 'theories. One fact remains, however, and - from that there is no escape, viz., the tactical weakness of any ship is the standard possi- bility of the whole fleet, particularly as to mo- tor and turning qualities. - There ate, for instance, several eccentricities in our present battle and armored cruiser di- visions that are deplorable, viz., in-turning screws and out-of-date and indifferent steering gear. No question of expense should stand in the way of making good these defects. Nor should armored protection .and heavy arma- ment ever be sacrificed: to speed, as speed is only attainable, without this sacrifice, by great increase in displacement. It remains to be proven that turbine engines are worth the tactical sacrifice due to injecting into our ex- isting fleet units whose handling qualities are uncertain and so different from other ships. Radical departures from conservative methods are alluring, but where we balk at liquid fuel for boilers (which is largely a strategic question) why ignore tactical considerations in engine design. As a matter of fact it would seem reason- able to wait for the coming revolution in methods of propulsion involved in internal combustion engines with no smoke-pipes rather than to follow all the fashions in European design. It is a common saying that we adopt ideas that are just going out of date abroad, but the relation of the tactical quali- ties of each ship designed, to those both building and built, should receive some con- sideration. The proper point of view for the average line officer should be to make the most of the ships as they are. There is too little practice as if in battle to enable any one to pronounce our present arrangements defective, except in minor details. test of ordnace. Battle tactics is the best test of the battle qualities of our fleet. There is today in our navy a tendency to formulate our tactics rigidly on the basis of rectangular movements. At the risk of being heretical, after so many years of being very orthodox, the writer is inclined to believe that in "sparring for position" in the ap- proach to the attack, oblique movements have & A akg use, a it . sees bat sufficient to justify a recognition of thei i : gether anathema, : F not being alto DISCUSSION. Capt. William Hovgaard: Com- mander Niblack proposes to use the conning-tower as an intermediate com- munication station, the commander of the ship and the navigator being in our navy in this con- a satisfactory range instruments which . have not been - signaling will ever displace all . Gunnery is the best . THe Marine REVIEW stationed outside the conning-tower, without any protection, on the bridges. Of course, conditions will oceur where this plan will work satis- factorily, as for instance when facing an enemy of very inferior strength or efficiency; but, evidently, the ser-: vice and the design of the 'ship must be based upon the conditions of a serious engagement with an efficient enemy." __ In my opinion, as expressed in my paper on. "The Seagoing Battleship," 1904, no men, not even the most un- important, should be permanently stationed in the unprotected parts of a battleship during action, least of all the commanding officer and his staff. This opinion has been con- firmed I believed by the experience of the battte of Tsushima. A brief description of conditions on board the Russian flagship, the Souvaroff, during the battle, based. on the ac- count given by Capt. Semenoff in his admirable book, "The Battle of Tsushima," will be sufficient to prove this statement. The Souvaroff, it ap- pears, was put out of action almost entirely by shell fire, and more par- ticularly by the Japanese 12-in. high explosive shell. These shells were very sensitive, they burst on striking the water, and even the slightest ob- stacle on a ship, such as hand-rails, guys, etc., would bring them to ex- plosion. The charge of these shells was so large thatthey might be de- scribed as veritable mines, and their effect was threefold: 1. SPLINTER EFFECT. Innumerable splinters and fragments were pro- jected as a shower over the ship, causing numerous casualties, pene- trating through gunports and _ sight holes, and damaaging all exposed ob- jects such as signal gear, compasses or other instruments, fire mains and hose, etc. _ 2, BLAST EFFECT.--The shells seemed to act more by the blasting effect than by direct impact. Steel plates were torn in pieces, and huge open- ings produced in the unprotected ship's side, funnels and masts. were turned over, the 12 pdr. and lighter guns were blown from their mount- ings without showing any sign of a direct hit, steel ladders were crum- pled into rings, etc. 3. INCENDIARY EFFECT. The explosion 2 Pe aed: accompanied by an ex- od Se ues flame, seemed to oo ne ae spread over and ignite everything, Hammocks, boats drench with water, the wood ie Psa bridges sad even th Soa ahs a. : 'he paint on the steel ght fire in a moment. To all this must.be added the poisonous effect of the gases developed by an explosion, About one hour after the commence- ment of the battle, the situation on board the Souvaroff was as follows: The casualties were so numerous that - reinforcements were required everywhere, even in the turrets, where splinters pene- trated; the reserves were soon exhausted; dead men were left to lie where they had fallen, and there were not men enough left to even look after the wounded. Most of the signalmen were killed or wounded and the signal gear completely destroyed. Serious fires were raging on the upper and spar deck, among the boats and in the officers' quarters. The fire mains and hose were destroyed, leaving no proper appliances with which to fight the fire. The starboard side of the bridges was destroyed and the ladders were gone, the spar deck had here fallen down and was burning in a bright flame on the upper deck, and the debris completely blocking the passage.. On the port side the | bridges were on fire, and burning ham- mocks blocked the ladders; the chart- house was also on fire. All men stationed on the bridges, such as the signalmen, had long since been swept away or driven under shelter. The heat in the conning-tower now be-. came unbearable, and the thick smoke prevented any possible outlook, the com- pass and all other instruments inside the conning-tower were destroyed, except the telegraph to one-of the engines and a voice-pipe to the other. In the conning- tower at that, time were Admiral Rozh- destvensky, who was wounded in the head, back and right leg, besides several small splinter wounds, the flag-captain and the navigator, both wounded, and three other persons. Five or six dead bodies were lying on the floor. Several other persons had: been wounded in the conning-tower and were now in the hos- pital. It was determined to leave the conning-tower and to steer from the low- er fighting position, but no passage was left from the bridge except through the armored tube. The dead bodies having been, dragged away, the hatch over the armored tube was raised and the admiral and his staff let themselves down through the tube. Immediately after this, when the admiral tried to find another position from which he could follow the battle, he was severely wotnded and_ incapable thereafter of leading the battle. Two hours later the Souvaroff was re- duced to a burning and smoking wreck, funnels and masts were gone, a suffocat- ing smoke, drawn down through the venti- lators, filled the lower parts of the ship, which were now dark and silent, the dy- namos and engines having stopped for want of steam, and the men probably all