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1902.] Africa the rate was in the proportion of two to three. The Levant tariff was fixed with the object of capturing the Levant trade, and it has done so. Except for a few American rates there are no railway rates in the world so low as these two German tariffs. In England the lowest rail- way rates for shipping goods are those of the London &.South Western Co. between London and Southampton docks, For the carriage of shipping goods, either way in wagon loads, rates are: For class 1, .79 of a penny per ton per mile; for class 2, .95 of a penny per ton per mile, and for class 3 it is 1.05 penny per ton per mile. The committee heard also evidence by Sir Robert Giffen, formerly chief of the statistical and commercial department of the board of trade. He stated his opinion that legislation should be looked at from the point of view of keeping our ships rather than satisfying this or that humani- tarian view. He could not go into the sufficiency of the supply of sailors in the mercantile marine, because he was not sure how far the crews of the mercantile marine would be available in the time of war, as large crews would be wanted for the merchant ships used for carrying supplies. He thought there should be a large proportion of British seamen on board the mercantile marine. The larger part of the crews and persons em- ployed on the ships were necessarily not seamen in the proper sense of the word. Engineers, stokers, and even stewardesses were counted as part of the seamen on the mercantile marine; and the numbers that would be available for ships of war, whether British or foreign, would be compara- tively small. It was important that as soon as possible the government should encourage the maintenance of British ships. If it were found necessary to sweep away some of the stipulations which were somewhat discouraging to the British seamen it should be done. The subsidizing of our ships, he admitted, would involve very large sums indeed. Foreign governments must come to terms. We should try to negotiate and inti- mate, first of all, what our policy is going to be. He objected to the use MARINE REVIEW. : 19 fair play in certain points he was prepared to take care of himself, in spite of foreign competition, but he could not be treated in the future as he had been treated in the past. The first thing they wanted was the abolition of light dues. Nearly £2,000,000 which had been collected for this purpose from the ship owners was unexpended. Mr. Renwick said he thought Great Britain ought to have its coast trade exclusively in its own hands, and, if possible, it ought also to have the trade between the mother country and the colonies, and the jinter-colonial trade. The United States, Russia, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and even Egypt close their coasts to foreign trade. Sir John Colomb, M. P., has been lecturing on British trade, inter- national and external. In war the volume and direction of interchange in the case of the internal branch would not, he said, be varied by the mere fact of rupture with a foreign state; in the case of external trade it was Otherwise. The result due to war on our trade was likely to be rela- tively more marked at colonial and Indian ports than at home ports. A declaration of war would affect shipping in much the same way as it would affect commerce; it would reduce our operations between British ports and foreign ports and our operations between foreign ports. The effect produced by fear of loss expressed in insurance rates was of im- measurable consequence on shipping in war time. Confidence would depend upon belief in the ability of ships to escape capture. This brought into review considerations concerning the international constitution of the mercantile marine, and concerning arrangements for the external pro- tection of it. We could not withdraw from sea commerce in time of war. The withdrawal of the merchant flag from the sea might be possible for other nations, but not for us. It is our business to concern ourselves with the defence of our mercantile marine rather than its utilization for purposes of attack. The utility of a merchant steamer is limited by speed and endurance. Flight is the liner's only defense, and her power of THE NEBRASKAN OF THE AMERICAN-HAWAIIAN STEAMSHIP CO.'S FLEET. : Built by the New York Ship Building Co., Camden, N. J. of the word "reprisals" in regard to coasting trade. He did not object to the government making arrangements not to carry competition to extremes provided this country could secure a fair share of the shipping business of the world, and necessarily that would be a very large share. He did not object to the employment of Lascars on British ships, be- cause they were British subjects and good. seamen for certain purposes. He also said it was a matter of speculation whether the threat of restric- tion of colonial and coast trading would have the desired effect on foreign nations. It was quite on the cards that the German lines might seek to develop a trade with Dutch and French.possessions in the east, and still they would be able to maintain a very considerable trade. He did not think subsidies would have the effect of raising prices. Sir Robert es evidence has been much commented on, but not generally agreed with. NEWS OF THE OWNERS OF TRAMP SHIPS. The ocean tramp does three-fourths of the ocean trade of the world. And as representing the views of tramp owners, take the evidence of Mr. George Renwick, M. P., managing owner of a large fleet of tramps. He said he was not in favor of direct subsidies except in very exceptional cases. For instance, where it was necessary to open up trade, say in the West India islands or the east coast of Africa, where there is not a suffi- cient inducement in the quantity of cargo or the number of passengers to put on a line of steamers, he would give a direct subsidy. He would do it for political reasons, and for the good of the country and the colo- nies generally. He thought it would be unfair to give subsidies to the big liners without giving them to the ordinary cargo steamers, and that would mean an enormous amount of money. He did not think that was necessary. The great so-called passenger lines are going in largely for tramp or cargo ships. - The White Star, the Cunard, the British India, and the P. & O. companies are building a large number of cargo ships. Large liners eould take care of themselves. If the British ship owner had - break of war. offence is restricted to operations against merchant ships. From this point of view the mercantile marine of other nations must be examined in order to estimate the actual danger to which our commerce might be exposed in war. Britain. possesses forty-five vessels, the dual alliance twenty-two, the triple alliance twelve, and the United States eleven, over 4,000 tons and 17 knots. The forty-five British ships include five in the Atlantic combine. - : Sir John Colomb's survey of the relative conditions and inherent properties of mercantile marine in their attack and defence aspects brought him to enumerate what should be two broad principles of British policy. The first of these is to encourage private enterprise to develop the speed, endurance and carrying capacity of British liners engaged in regularly carrying on the internal sea business of our empire, on con- ditions binding them to continue to run on their own lines in war and being prepared to receive suitable armament and gun crews on the out- Between British ports and British ports our sea business would thus be carried on in war as in peace. We could not, Sir John pointed out, propose to arm vessels engaged in carriage to foreign ports. The second principle is that it should no longer be considered that the whole obligation and cost of providing for the security of British sea commerce and shipping should rest solely on the shoulders of British citizens domiciled in the United Kingdom, but that a common necessity demands a great British combine between all parts of the empire to seuse in war the stability of the British economic position, and the existence 0 the empire itself. The general character of our shipping legislation has for some years tended to discourage British shipping enterprise. A policy of continuous pin-pricks has heavily handicapped our shipping rarer from a national point of view. The question of the invasion of the Unite Kingdom or of military descents by sea on any British territory 1s oe termined by the position of the ports of possible enemies, and the strengt and composition of their mercantile marine. Our fleet now costs us over £30,000,000 a year, and if certain foreign nations go on developing sea