The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

a MARINE REVIEW AND MARINE RECORD. tion to each other. Engineering is the art of constructing engines or machines, the art of executing civil or military work which re- quires a special knowledge or use of machinery or the principles of mechanics. Seamanship is an acquaintance with the art of managing and navigating a ship at sea. It is difficult to decide which of these two words includes the other when applied to the naval service. Ina battleship both involve the handling and train- ing of bodies of men. Perhaps, since a battleship can be managed only by means of machinery, engineering is legitimately a branch of seamanship. It is a branch of overwhelming importance; but, nevertheless, there are many other things besides the manage- ment of .a ship involved in seamanship. A knowledge of the sea and of storms might very properly be classified as seamanship. Still, engineering, as involving the motive power, the guns and the technical qualities of the ship, is the chief thing to be studied. During the discussion of the personnel bill one of the advo- cates of the bill referred to the future naval officer as a fighting engineer, and in many senses the description is a correct one, for engineering must necessarily be the motive, or the foundation, upon which the education of a future naval officer is built up. The change recognizing this fact has already taken place at the naval academy. The personnel bill, therefore, came as a final settlement of a struggle which had marked the transition from sails to machinery. It formed a clear dividing line between a ship which could keep the sea for an indefinite period and one which had only a steaming radius dependent upon the coal supply. The old type had lasted for about four centuries, having succeeded stili another kind of vessel which had a radius dependent upon the muscular power of rowers. In some re- spects coal endurance is similar to muscular endurance; both may become exhausted, and both are limited to definite dis- tances from the home base. Whatever naval officers or civilians may think of the merits of the personnel bill, nothing can ever carry us back to the old regime which prevailed in the unsatis- factory union of sails and steam within the same vessel. The change from one type to another was therefore necessarily accom- panied by a change in the education of officers and men, in the or- ganization, and even in the strategy and tactics adopted in the time of war. One of the most important problems which our service has to solve today is the relation of the present engineer- ing to all three of these points. It is difficult to write on engineering in the navy without re- peating much that has already been said. Every officer knows that the modern battleship is directed in almost every detail by machinery, and that the organization must be such as to secure the highest efficiency of the machines. Some are used for moy- ing the ship asa whole, some for handling the guns and turrets, and some for the numerous auxiliary purposes connected with the comfort and convenience of the crew. Few can be spared, and in many cases a single weak element would jeopard the safety of the entire ship's company. To the end that every ma- chine, including the guns which, after all, are but special types of machinery, shall perform the function allotted to it in its original design, every man must be well trained in the care and use of machines or boilers. The responsibility of this training falls upon the commanding officer, who must therefore have an intel- ligent understanding of every element which affects the efficiency of his ship; otherwise he cannot do his whole duty without undue effort and anxiety. It is not sufficient that a man should have common sense and experience of the sea in order to enable him to take good care of a battleship. He may be able to carry her out of port and to bring her back again. He may have a good knowledge of inter- national law, and therefore be able to serve the nation well in diplomacy. He may, furthermore, be able to discipline his crew; but in the test of a long war, where preparation and care of machinery are bound to count in success or failure, he is badly handicapped if he does not know from personal experience all the details of his ship. His early education must, therefore, have been related to the material problems of his command, and his experience must have been such as to fix definitely what he has learned at school. NAVAL ACADEMY IS NOW A SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING. The naval academy is no longer a school of seamanship, un- less we define seamanship in a very broad sense, but is essen- tially a school of engineering, where all the fundamental sub- jects are such as would be found in a good technical school. The course of study for all cadets today is along much the same lines as that given to cadet engineers twenty-nine years ago, only it is a better engineering course. Graduates can now fill engi- neers' positions in civil life quite as well as young men from technical and scientific schools. This seems not to be well un- derstood even by the service, and its effect in modifying the entire personnel of the navy, as class after class graduates, can- not be estimated. Of one thing we may be sure, namely, that in the management of ships and in the great number of details con- nected with their. design, their equipment and their organization, the engineering motive is bound to replace the traditions which formed themselves around the sails and the broadside guns of the old frigates. This has up to this time been recognized only in part by the navy, where the benefit of the personnel bill seems still open to argument. My own correspondence lead me to say that there are two larger has accepted the situation an question seriously the whole change. and discussion with officers would parties in the service; the d the smaller is disposed to In the eyes of the former 29 the management of the navy under the new organization has been entirely successful, while the latter believe that a new engi- neer corps will be established within a comparatively short time. It seems to me that the personnel bill has not yet had a fair trial. While much has been done at the naval academy, the ordinary routine on board ship has not adapted itself to the con- tinuation of the work done there, and the obvious intention of the bill has not been thoroughly carried out. One familiar with the navy knows perfectly well that there have been difficulties in the way. Every bureau has been clamoring for officers, and every corps has felt itself depleted during the past five years. We have had this great reorganization to carry out at a time of tremendous expansion in colonial interests and in ships. There have not been sufficient officers to go around, and therefore no branch of the service has had its work done to the best advantage. Neverthe- less some method should have been found in the service to pro- vide successors for the old engineer corps and for those skilled in engineering who are rapidly disappearing from the active list. Within ten years there will be few officers available for sea ser- vice who in the early years of. their careers had responsible engi- neering duties. It is not enough to detail a young graduate of the naval academy to receive instruction in the engine room; he must have responsible charge, and there is no reason why he should not be capable of taking it a few months after graduation. This should not be a question of the wishes of any individual, either subordi- nate or in command, but it should be the absolute requirement for a young officer's promotion. 'The theoretical objection that of- ficers cannot alternate between the engine room and the deck all their lives, does not apply at all, as the personnel bill never con- templated anything of this kind. It did contemplate, however, that the care and running of machinery should be placed in the hands of officers of the line, and that, therefore, they must obtain experience early in their careers. Three years in the engine room is none too long, and these three years should be within the first six years out of the naval academy. After that, officers should be detailed according to their tastes and abilities. In discussing the engineering question, officers commonly confuse the design and construction of machinery with its care and management in service. The two have no fixed, definite relation. The best designer of a gun, or of an engine, may not. be a good man to manage it in actual service. For the work. connected with design and, to a large extent, with repairs, a technical department of the line, or a separate technical corps, will be absolutely necessary, and there is nothing inconsistent with such a corps in the personnel bill. The intention of that. bill was to end the strife in the navy and .to force engineering into the daily duties of line officers. The hitch in the old organi- zation was the total absence of inducement to study engineering, except in the engineer corps. So long as a new engineer corps is chosen from the line after officers have had sufficient experience to know their own tastes, the spirit of the new organization will | be maintained. Furthermore, it is doubtful if there is anything in the statutes to prevent the secretary of the navy from detail- ing officers permanently to engineering duties, and thus, by ad- ministrative process, creating an engineer corps. The main dif- ficulty in the way would be found in securing the willing co- operation of officers so detailed unless some inducement were held out. ; NOT OPPOSED TO SPECIALIZATION. When we ccnsider the care and running of machinery, too much has been made of the phrases that "this is' an age of spe- cialization" and that the present scheme is "contrary to the genius of modern times." 'That is perfectly true so far as it goes, but on board ship a good officer is the specialist, and the more he knows about his ship the better for the service. As a matter of fact, there is no difficulty whatever in teaching a midshipman all the details on board ship if the opportunities are placed before him. With his grounding in engineering he is ready to take hold of anything and to learn the management of men besides. The fundamental fact to be kept before him at all times is that the care and adjustment of the machinery of a ship, from the pro- pellers to the turrets, demand greater judgment and energy than running it. Ifa machine is in good order, pulling a lever ought to start it or stop it. Young officers should, therefore, have a large share in duties connected with repairing, cleaning and ad-. justing machinery and boilers, and too much emphasis cannot be. placed on the fact that this share must be .a responsible one. There is danger that the service may drift into too great a dependence upon the warrant machinists, bringing up again with-. in a few years another discussion similar to that which prevailed -- for thirty years after the civil war. This would be a most un- fortunate condition of affairs, and all the work connected with or--- ganization would have to be done over again. What could have- been thought of a system which turned the practical manage- ment of sails over to the warrant officers under the theory that the sails and rigging formed only one of the many details under the care of executive officers? The commanding officer would soon have found himself as much in the hands of warrant of- ficers as were the soldiers who commanded before the reorganiza-. tion of the British sailing navy, and as will be the officers of our. service in case the machinery is allowed to fall back into the hands of officers without commissions. The opening of the war- _ rant grades to machinists was intended to promote efficiency by giving them the same incentive already provided for the other en- listed men. It would be most unfortunate to have it used as a