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M AR oP ok. 2 KR £. Vv a fe 21 of training the guns by turning the whole ship round was very awkward. Col. Edwin A. Stevens confessed to a liking for floating batteries. They had been used at Gibraltar and also by the French in the Crimean war. -If a vessel isn't really able to run away from anything or to catch anything, even if only slightly deficient in these particulars, she might for practical purposes be totally so. He doubted therefore whether it was wise to build monitors which have slight speed and which have not the offensive and defensive powers of battleships. It was a question whether it would not be better to build floating forts than monitors. _He suggested the sinking or grounding of a floating fort in New York harbor. True, it would not be exactly a floating fort, but it could be lifted at some expense and moved elsewhere. ¢ COM'DR NOVGAARD'S PAPER "THE SEAGOING BATTLESHIP." The concluding paper at the forenoon session was by Com'dr William Hovgaard upon the subject "The Seagoing Battle- ship.' It is impossible in the present issue to deal more com- pletely with this paper than to summarize it but it will be dealt. with later. Briefly Com'dr Hovgaard's ideas were as follows: "The present paper is an attempt, on basis of general prin- ciples, to arrive at the type and size of warship, best suited to secure command of the ocean. First, the fundamental elements of the design--armament, speed and radius of action are shown to depend on the work which the ship has to do, a work that varies from year to year with technical progress, political and strategical conditions, etc. These elements being chosen, it is shown how the other elements--nautical qualities and protection, follow from those and from conditions on the ocean as a logical consequence of the aforesaid general prin- ciples. The result does not indeed differ greatly from recent battleship designs, although important modifications are pro- posed, but, whatever the conclusion, it is believed that such a discussion must always be of interest, since it aims at basing the design on fundamental and unchangeable principles in- stead of on current practice or personal views. It appears that only by placing the design on such basis is it possible to avoid the vascillations in ship building policy, under which many navies have suffered, and only on such basis is it pos- sible without error to discern the true direction which progress must follow under the present rapid development. "It is imperative, just at the present time, that we should carefully consider this question of the best type of battleship, for not only have the means of attack lately been considerably improved, but recent war experience has thrown light on their use, which with many people has shaken the faith in the existing type. "The improvements referred to in the means of attack are: "tr. Increased penetrative power of guns, due to higher velocity and improvement in the metal of projectiles, and to the use of caps. Thus the 12-in. gun has gained about 25 per cent in penetrative power since I9OI. "2. Advance in gunnery. "3. Development of the submarine boat and the torpedo. "The Russo-Japanese war has brought out the fact that submarine attack both by mines and torpedoes has been far more frequently successful than anticipated, although it can- not be asserted that the effects of such attack have exceeded what might have been expected. "Hence it has been argued that it is unreasonable to con- struct ships representing a capital of some eight millions of dollars, which it takes several years to build and which carry a crew largely made up of trained experts, representing years of costly education, if such ships are quite frequently exposed to almost instantaneous destruction. ; "Notably the armor appears to many of little value, since it is useless in case of submarine attack and since it is unable to keep out the projectiles of modern guns. Their conclusion is that it would be better to abandon or rediice the armor protec- tion and build vessels of small or moderate displacement since thereby the loss of the individual ship would be of less con- sequence, and the greater number of units would reduce the chances of loss for each ship. This idea was embodied in the principles of 'la jeune école' in France already in the eighties, and has recently been advocated by so eminent an authority as the late Vice Admiral Makaroff. "As shown in the following such revolutionary policy of ship construction is likely to prove fatal to any power for whom command of the ocean is under certain contingencies of war a necessity. "It is shown that for service on the ocean the largest class of battleship offers the best combination of military and nautical qualities, and that hence for a given expenditure the greatest fighting value is obtained with this type. Smaller ships of whatever class, necessarily deficient in some or all of the essential qualities, will be unable to drive the large ships from the sea. "It is admitted that for coast work the large battleship is less suited now than formerly, although, as shown in this paper, its power to resist submarine attack may be greatly im- proved. It seems advisable to entrust the coast defense and attack chiefly to smaller ships of special types, and to use the sea-going battleships for this service only in case of urgent necessity and then only with greatest caution. This implies virtually a restriction in the sphere of action and hence in the importance of battleships, but there is still a long step to the abandonment of the type. CONSTITUTE PRINCIPAL FIGHTING STRENGTH, "The sea-going battleships constitute the principal fighting strength on the sea; they form the nucleus of naval power, and to them all other types of sea-going warships are sub- sidiary, serving chiefly for their assistance and_ protection. The type that is to fulfil this function must be essentially a fighting ship, and should be able to engage all classes of ves- sels without ever being placed at a disadvantage. It should be able under certain circumstances to fight forts and shore batteries. "It should be capable of use both for offensive and de- fensive duties, and must generally be designed to operate all over the world. It should therefore have sufficient sea- going capability for continued ocean service and possess a great steaming radius. The speed must be such as not to place it at a disadvantage compared with battleships of other navies, nor should it fall below the speed of battleships of the same navy. "Without yet assigning quantitative values to the elements which make up the fighting capacity, we may state as a first general principle that the all round use to which this class of vessel is to be put renders it necessary to fulfil each of the claims to seaworthiness, armament, protection, speed and en- durance in a harmonious way, so that no one of these ele- ments shall be unduly favored at the expense of the others. "If a sea-going battleship is deficient in any one of these important qualities, even although she may excel in one or more of the others, she is liable, at one time or other, to be placed at a serious disadvantage, namely when matched against an opponent, in which these nautical and military qualities are more harmoniously balanced, even if the opponent is not of greater displacement. "This principle has always been followed in all successful battleship designs, but the repeated advocacy of smaller specialized types implies a doubt of its validity, which makes it necessary to further explain and prove the principle by showing that the various elements of a design are organically connected. "Another important principle follows from the all round