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240 Our Commercial Dependence By Aprian H. Boots, 1n The Navy. If the national flag of our country is ever to appear in foreign ports, not alone as the symbol of our potential fighting strength as a nation, but as an emblem of commercial power as well, it behooves us to pause and seri- ously consider the methods by which our foreign rivals have outdistanced us in the race for commercial suprem- acy,--the controlling factor of com- plete industrial independence. Delivery of Goods How quick we all would be to con- demn the policy of a large department store that should refuse to exercise control over the conveyance of pur- chases made for delivery to our homes, by not owning the vans and employ- ing its own drivers to perform that important function. How long would any department store be able to suc- cessfully compete with others. if it sought to meet the elements of com- petition only as far as its counter sales, and then turned its sales over to a competitor to complete the trans- action by effecting the physical de- livery to customers? With astute em- ployes on the wagons, scrutinizing the quality, the character, and the destina- tion of all shipments, how long would it be before the knowledge thus gained would be availed of by the competitor, to cut into the other's.trade? In the end, which house would command the business situation? And yet such a procedure, if followed, could not but be sanctioned by the present standard of business ethics. The matter is put thus in order to drive home the _ fact, lamentable though it may be, that we are today in precisely the same relation to for- eign merchants that a department store turning its deliveries over to a rival would be to that rival. Figura- tively, we end at the counter our com- petition as to quality and prices for the world's trade, and then call in the vehicles of our foreign rivals to de- liver, to our customers abroad, the surplus products of our energy and brains. What is true in principle with dis- sociated individuals, is true in princ- ple with nations; the difference is in degree only and not in form. The minimum of dealings between nations is many times the maximum of deal- ings between individuals or even larger corporations. Corrective measures in the adjustment of international prob- lems, therefore, very often assume such huge proportions that their ac- THE MARINE REVIEW complishment is entirely beyond the pale of unaided individual effort. Even when possible, it is not to be expected that private enterprise will engage in purely Utopian achievements, unat- tended by immediate financial gain. Such matters should, very properly and necessarily, be dealt with by the peo- ple as a whole, through and by their government. If we must seek prece- dent for this doctrine, we have but to investigate the policies of other governments to find that, in the mat- ter of foreign trade, they take the most effective measures to insure workable conditions under which in- dividual enterprise, within their own ranks, carry out the functions essen- tial to their own welfare. In the case of England, of France, of Germany, and of Japan, there is in- sufficient land surface really to sup- ply home food requirements, so all these people must look to the granger countries for the deficit in their food supplies. If, therefore, they must buy from abroad, they must also sell to pay for what they buy, and thus the preservation of foreign markets is vital to their existence. This brings us to consideration of the political precepts created, by these federal and imperial powers, to accomplish that end. Territorial Dependencies First, large territorial dependencies were acquired either by conquest or by peaceful means. These dependen- cies were joined to the parent coun- tries by regular sea-communicating ser- vices under patronage of the gov- ernment, and were given an ocean mail contract, an admiralty subvention, a construction bounty, or whatever might be necessary to induce citizens at home to engage in the deep sea enterprise sought and to continue it, under conditions prescribed that would secure the trades for their own peo- ple, during the unprofitable period. of the maritime ventures. Later, with increased numerical and financial strength at home, this broad political maritime policy was extended to all civilized trading communities in the world, in order to insure foreign pat- rons after the colonies became self- sustaining. The wisdom of this is best attested by the extent to which the world's trade is now controlled by these maritime powers. Not only is the trade of the colonies secured, but today we find ourselves paying to these countries over $300,000,000 for transporting our own foreign trade, Marine Rev--Feby 4--Por-roy ¥. which last year amounted to more than $3.000,000,000. Thus have these June, 1914 rivals wrested from us 10 per cent of our foreign exchange for perform. ing the task of delivering our goods, which today we cannot do ourselves. Furthermore, the same maritime pol- icy has secured for England and Ger- many four-fifths of the entire foreign trade of Central and South America, which amounts to over $2,000,000,000; and this, notwithstanding the fact that both countries are at a much greater geographical disadvantage than are we for that 'business. Can~any one, who understands, deny that it is the influ- ence of these European subsidies, ad- ministered as they are, that. has made the trade of Latin America set to- wards Europe? Military A dvantages It is proper at this point, 'before considering the cost, to note the other military advantages that have attended the outlays incidental to pursuance of this strong maritime policy. By the payment of construction bounties or admiralty subventions, representing an insignificant part of the initial cost of construction, vessels were built to conform to military and naval re- quirements, for use as transports or cruisers in time of need, and these same payments made them subject to conscription in case of war. This sup- port increased the navy's efficiency suf- ficiently to guarantee uninterrupted trade .communications with friendly powers, in time of war. The constant peaceful employment of a large num- ber of citizens on the seas, keeps in training a vast corps of seafaring men, always available for the navy, at no expense to the government except in time of war. Again, the home indus- try of ship building, for both mer- chant and fighting ships, is kept alive, giving employment to a large number of people. In England, Germany and Japan this industry is constantly in- creasing and is already a source of great productiveness. But, apart from this, these military features, it will be seen, constitute important additions to the national defense, and must, therefore, be taken into account when considering the cost imposed upon the government by subsidizing, for home benefits, private-owned merchant ves- sels. According to the last annual state- ment of the United States commis- sioner of navigation, England spent last year for subsidies, ocean mail contracts and admiralty subventions, the equivalent of $7,905,764, which 1s equal to about 5 per cent of her naval appropriations for the same year. France paid out for mail subsidies, navigation and armament bounties, and e