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An Open Letter In Which Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels May See Himself As Others See Him ASAINGTON, D.C. Sept, 1, W 1914, My dear Mr. Daniels.-- I wonder whether you realize that you are manager of a great industrial concern, representing an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars, with a payroll of over a hundred thou- sand names; and I also wonder whether you actually know what prod- uct that concern was established to. turn out? There is nothing in your official acts and utterances, so far as I am aware, to show that you realize the one or know the other. If there were, I should not be calling your attention at this moment to the navy as a vast factory or to its product, "Battle Efficiency". Your Experience and Capacity It might be unkind to inquire into your experience and the capacity you have already displayed in managing similar immense combinations of cap- ital and labor, yet, were these ques- tions asked there might arise in your mind a conviction that it would be wise to move very slowly in intro- ducing innovations and to take no im- portant step unadvisedly. By unad- visedly I do not mean the counsels of those immediately about you who are apt, such is human nature, to sug- gest only that which they believe will be agreeable to you, but I do mean a consulting of what may be termed "service public opinion'. Unfortun- ately for yourself, you have, like your predecessor, exerted all your power to prevent any expression of this gen- eral sentiment by forbidding the open discussion of every professional topic, of whatever description. There are, at most, but a very few matters which in themselves are confidential--such as new devices in ordnance and torpe- does or plans of naval campaigns and actions. No officer, one could al- most say no enlisted man, would ever think of discussing such things in public--but omitting these and such other subjects, if any, as may be defi- nitely proscribed by the department, the whole field of naval activity might well be thrown open to debate con- ducted within the limits of courteous and impersonal treatment. It is a matter of record that an article pre- pared for the naval institute was for- bidden publication on the ground that it divulged important official secrets-- notwithstafiding the fact that its every statement was drawn from printed an- nual reports of the secretary of the navy, freely accessible to whomso- ever cared to read them. The result of this policy, past and present, is that the secretary of the navy never knows what the navy at large thinks of any subject, great or small. It would al- most seem as if he preferred igno- rance to knowledge. Why debar yourself from profiting by this thrash- ing out of important questions of pol- icy and technique? Possibly its value would at times be small, but occasion- ally it would be beyond price. And. of course, you are not bound to gov- Respect of Authority Unfortunately for you the public cannot readily forget that in your desire to break down the sense of subordination and respect of authority, which is the keystone of naval discipline, you were hardly persuaded to suppress your orders compelling enlisted men, against their will, to mess. with their of- ficers; or that a man of your exalted position should have ex- hibited such astounding misappre- hension of the most vital thing in naval life. The public has not for this and other matters visited you with its disapprobation so much as with its ridicule. I need hardly re- nund one who ought to be familiar with our history that when a man is laughed at he is _ politically doomed. ern yourself by these opinions. For what you do you are solely responsi- ble. Rewrite your Navy Regulations, Article 1534, and encourage officers publicly to express their views, over their own signatures, on topics not confidential, and you will never regret your action which inter alia, will re- move on their part the unpleasant sense of being muzzled and will pro- vide a useful safety valve to now suppressed emotions. Do not fall back on the permission accorded to officers and others to address the de- partment on service. matters. All know the futility of this authoriza- tion; all know that such communica- tions never meet, or practically never meet, the secretary's eyes. His subor- dinates do not allow him to see them, especially when they do not accord with their own views. Doubtless it may be urged that as every industrial plant turns out, inci- dentally, certain by-products, so has the navy its by-products. However true this is, it is equally true that the plant which neglects its main for its by-products is well on the road to bankruptcy. Are you quite sure that the navy's by-products do not com- mand the larger share of your thought and attention? To manufacture eco- nomically and efficiently is the aim of every manager. Failing in this re- spect, he is quickly replaced by an- other with sounder judgment or more abinty. Thiscis the law. of--indus- trial life. In practice, useless or un- profitable departments are eliminated; whole plants not advantageously lo- cated, are closed down and abandoned. Is the navy exempt from this law of: economics: <Not':so, i battle. effi- ciency is the one aim, but grotesquely so if its by-products are made para- mount. Whatever action is contem- plated should be tested by its effect on battle. efficiency. If it is seen to further that: end; adopt it at all. costs. If its value is problematical, defer its adoption. If it does not contribute unmistakably to that end, reject it without delay or regret. These rules are safe and invariable. Diverting the Navy's Work To divert the navy's work, funds or interest to any. other cause, worthy Or unworthy, whether it be seeking the good will of the labor unions; the operation of useless navy yards; the killing off of private shipyards, armor plants, powder factories; the sudden announcement of new _ qualifications for promotion; the discouraging of pri- vate makers of naval material; are only justifiable when the proof is clear beyond peradventure that bat- tle efficiency is thereby enhanced. Has the latter been your guide in your at- titude towards these and similar ques- tions? One great source of waste is the maintenance of navy yards which do not contribute to battle efficiency. On this point a wise and competent ob- server, in his "Art of Naval Warfare', lays down the true doctrine in these words: "The general principle to be fol- lowed in the case of dockyards and See Ok Siar le oy. ie ee eels Sis aaa la Ae as anes Sega