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October, 1914 similar government establishments is to form and keep them on the small- est scale compatible with real require- ments. No portion of the naval ex- penditure of a country should be scru- tinized more closely or incurred with greater reluctance than that devoted to their creation and _ expansion. Where the resources of a country ad- -mit of recourse to private industry, the desirability of permitting an over- flow of work from the government establishments to the latter should exert unceasing influence upon naval policy. This leads up to the state- inent of another principle. The num- ber of government establishments of the kind in question should be kept as small as possible. What is wanted is, not the most we can get, but the fewest that we can manage to do with. This should be regarded as axi- omatic." It is difficult to estimate the sav- ing which an observance of Sir Cy- prian Bridge's well founded injunc- tions would yield. If, in addition, up- to-date methods were employed in the half dozen yards essential to bat- tle efficiency, the resulting economy would amount to tens of millions of eollars: annually. Is tc mot= worth while, is it not a duty to work toward this end? Concentrate on Battle Efficiency You cannot devote your undoubted ability and great talents to a better purpose than to reducing to a mini- mum the navy's inescapable by-prod- ucts and to concentrating all your energies on the one real object, the sole reason for existence of the navy, battle efficiency. There are ugly rumors current to the effect that not in a generation have politics and politicians been so potent at the navy department as now. You yourself know how true or false these rumors be, and, being told of their existence, can easily put an end to them, proving by acts and not mere denials that they are hide- ously untrue. None of your predecessors had a more lively appreciation of the pow- ers inherent in your great office and none was more ready to use them than you are. Like Hosea Bigelow, "I du like a man what ain't afeerd", and so I admire your energy and your fearlessness. Whether I think it wise on your part to check the flow of promotion by declining to accept the resignations of officers, thus keeping disgruntled men in the service to the detriment of its morale and, in so doing, to stimulate the growth of the so-called "hump"; or by pening appointments to the enlisted men to the naval academy to intro- THE MARINE REVIEW duce an element of discord among them similar to that which in the 70's wrecked the apprentice training sys- tem; or to forbid Jack Tar to spend his own money in the canteen on ar- ticles of his choice, through ruling out the proprietary brands he definite- ly prefers; or to interfere, possibly with ultimate defeat to the nation, with the training of officers and men for actual battle, by turning the. former into school masters and the latter into sul- len and reluctant school boys, many of whom entered the navy to escape the irksome drudgery of the school, thus 'rendering the service less popu- lar than at ought to. be; or to hold up temperate and hard-working officers to universal contempt by branding them in your recent order as lacking self-control in the presence of tempta- acts may be taken for granted. Killing Off of Private Shipyards To divert the navy's work, funds or interest to any other cause, worthy or unworthy, whether it be seeking the good will of the labor unions, the operation of useless navy yards, the killing off of pri- vate shipyards, armor plants, pow- der factories; the sudden announce- ment of new qualifications for pro- motion; the discouraging of private makers of naval material; are only justifiable when the proof 1s clear beyond peradventure that battle ef- ficiency is thereby enhanced. Has the latter been your guide im your attitude towards these and similar questions? tion to drink too much, a wholly un- merited and false accusation, etc., etc., it.is bootless to say. Yet I feel sure that a consulting of navy public opinion might have helped you, even if it did not alter your opinion or in- fluence your actions, to a broader view of these matters. "Audi alteram partem" is advice as sound as it 1s old. It is not an uncommon experience on the part of those who mean well to find that the results of their en- deavors differ widely from their ex- pectations. That you counted upon enhancing your reputation by your Not to believe this: would be to insult your intelligence. It is pertinent, there- fore, to ask whether and how much you have gained in this respect. While admitting that some of your innova- tions have been favorably acclaimed by many persons, whose opinions, being based on ignorance or on a ord wholly erroneous conception of the nature and extent of the task you have so lightly undertaken, are of no real value, yet an impartial summing up of the pros and cons have largely predominated. Unfortunately for you, the public cannot readily forget that in your desire to break down' the sense of subordination and respect of authority, which is the keystone of naval discipline, you were hardly per- suaded to suppress your order com- pelling enlisted men, against their will, to mess with their officers, or that a man in your exalted position should have exhibited such astound- ing misapprehension of the most vital thing in naval life. The public has not for this and other matters visited you with its disapprobation so much as with its ridicule. I need hardly remind one who ought to be familiar with our history that when a man is laughed at he is politically doomed. So far as those under you are con- cerned, one of your temperament and views could not be expected to have for them any particular regard or con- sideration. To you they are mere pawns on the chess board of your ambitions. None the less,' it can scarcely be comforting to reflect that their official happiness varies directly with the square of their distance from you; that a visit on your part to one of your ships in commission is dread- ed as a calamity, not to the ship, but to yourself. It is greatly to be feared that, un- less you speedily adopt a new policy, one in accord with the traditions of the service, and its sole aim battle efficiency, you are likely to be remem- bered chiefly for your follies, which no sadder fate can easily be imag- ined. This suggestion is not based on malice--far from it, but on a keen and friendly desire to put you right while it is yet time, if indeed there still be time to repair the damage you have done to your own name. There is no one who credits you more unreservedly with sincerity of purpose or who wishes your adminis- tration more brilliant and unqualified success than I, but profound convic- tion on my part forces me to repeat that it is only by holding fast to the one principle I have quoted and by gaging everything' by its effect on the navy's chief product, "battle ef- ficiency", that the success we both ardently desire can be achieved. Wishing you that success in un- stinted measure, I am, my dear Mr. Daniels, Your true friend, P. Decimus Muss, S.-P. QO. R: Retived, P. S. You may recall that my own unique idea of alternate military com-