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a lag yeaa eg RN DP ee EY THE MARINE REVIEW Probably the only measure of success realized by Germany against Great Britain has been in its cam- paign of attack by submarines. Nervous people have been appalled by the daily record of ships reported sunk; but anxiety is to some extent allayed when the pessimists realize that the net loss of tonnage through submarine warfare is about 2% per cent on the whole merchant fleet. Fortunately, Great Britain has a vast mercantile marine, and so it comes about that the proportional loss to merchant tonnage through enemy submarines is less than that caused by enemy ships during the years following Trafalgar. In the first 18 months of the war Great Britain lost 307 vessels valued at $51,700,000 or an average of $168,000 each, Britain May Be Handicapped After / the War with cargoes valued at $63,350,000. These losses not only cause present inconvenience in the conduct of the war, but reduce the prospective ability of the country to contend with its rivals for the international trade after the war. The shipping companies of Great Britain regard this with considerable concern, and go so far as to say that after the war the practical control by British shipping of the sea-borne commerce of the world will no longer remain unchallenged. While the mercantile tonnage has been seriously depleted by war losses, the output of fresh tonnage has been on a limited scale, and tt is well known that there has been great activity in the ship building yards of neutral countries. March, 1917 es eae June 30, last, classes were assigned to 362 new vessels of 790,209 tons, of which 356 were steamers or motor vesséls of a tonnage of 789,688, while six were sail- ing vessels of 521 tons. Of the above total 5544 per cent were built for the British Empire (United Kingdom 397,- 852 tons, Dominions 16,605 tons) and 375,747 tons or about 47% per cent to other countries. For Whom Should They Build The question has been raised whether British . shipbuilders shall hold back orders for neutral shipowners, and give preference to British companies and the country’s allies. The problem is rather a knotty one, because British shipbuild- ers are not prepared to allow their ship building supremacy to be lost through the refusal of orders from foreign firms. On the other hand, there is great reluctance to build for potential rivals ships required by British com- panies. It is argued that to build ships for employment under the British flag is better than to build ships which will sail under foreign colors, since, in the former case, the profits of building are secured, with: the prospect of a sub- stantial revenue from their employment in the ocean carrying trade. A _ great deal of the speculation as to the future it is recognized has an element of futility, since there will be a great temp- tation in the keen competition which will follow the war to take the order of the highest bidder. At the same time there is already a demand on patriotic grounds that ship builders shall be com- pelled to give precedence to the build- ing of ships destined to fly the British ‘flag. In this connection there is no little soreness over the fact that foreign ship- owners have benefitted by the substan- tial rise in freights resulting from the requisitioning of tonnage by the ad- miralty, while they have escaped the heavy additional war taxation which has fallen upon the owners of British ships. It is because of this serious view: taken by ship builders of future com- petition that so many of the - British shipping companies have lately been en- tering into new combinations, while carefully establishing strong reserves to meet future emergencies. Among the combines of the year have been the fol- lowing—the New Zealand Shipping Co., Ltd., and the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co.; the purchase of the fleet of the London & Northern Steamship Co., Ltd., by Pyman Watson & Co., Cardiff; the acquisition by Fur- ness Withy & Co., Ltd., of the whole fleet of the Prince line consisting of 42 steamers; the acquisition by the Uni- versal Steam Navigation Co. of the Ariadne Steamship Co., Ltd.; the pur- chase by Petersen & Co., Ltd. of the Calliope Steamship Co., Ltd. and the London Marine Steamship Co., Ltd. Many other examples might be cited. The reason for this is the expectation of*tremendous competition after the war, which must lead to a heavy fall in freights, and a severe financial strain to all the companies concerned. Of course, it is not denied that shipping has been tremendously prosperous, and it is on the foundation of this prosperity that the companies base their confidence for the future. To mention only a few, the Cairn line increased its dividend from 10 per cent to 30 per cent, the Court line from 10 per cent to 16 per cent, Mercantile Steamship from 17% per cent to 35 per cent, and side by side with these dividends the carry-forward has been greatly increased. A _ striking example is that of the Leyland com- pany which increased its profits from $1,492,000 in 1914, to $5,810,000 for 1916. So far the steamship companies have managed to resist the tremendous agita- tion for reduction of freights, one rea- son undoubtedly being that if freights were artificially reduced ships would be diverted to other countries prepared to pay higher prices than are offered in England. The government which has just been replaced repeatedly refused to declare commercial shipping a controled industry with a view to the regulation of freights. Mr. Runciman when ques- tioned on this subject said that the gov- ernment went fully into the question of commandeering the whole of British shipping in order to regulate freights and they came to the conclusion, which was confirmed by experts, that this par. ticular remedy would only aggravate the shortage of tonnage available for the United Kingdom and the allies and would make things worse instead of bet- ter. It does not follow at all that the new government will take this view and indeed if current rumors are well founded, Lloyd George, the new premier, has secured the support and co-opera- tion of the Labor party under a pledge to take over the whole of British ship- ping, in addition to the mines of the country. There is no great confidence in shipping circles that this policy will carry out the object in view, while, of course, by the interests concerned it would naturally be regarded with dis- favor. The Ton-for-Ton Policy Another matter on which strong ac- tion may possibly be taken relates to what is known as the ton-for-ton policy. This consists in a claim very strongly put forward and supported by London and Birmingham. chambers of commerce and other influential commercial bodies that Germany shall surrender shipping tonnage equivalent to that sunk during the war. It is urged that this would represent bare justice while it would do something to checkmate that vigorous mercantile warfare on which Germany is believed to have set her heart as a definite policy after the war. It is said that Germany can very well make this reparation seeing that before the war she possessed something like 5,000,000 tons of shipping of which very little .