The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

c ig March, 1919 Of course, the popular idea that the seas were swarming with sub- marines was a pronounced miscon- ception. This can readily be demon- strated by dividing the number of submarines surrendered by the Ger- mans in November into the number of square miles in the North Atlantic ocean. When it is realized that only 40 per cent of the total submarine fleet was ever in active operation at one time, it becomes at once apparent that even during the blackest month in the submarine campaign there were vast lonely sea areas as free and un- disturbed as when Columbus first set out on his westward voyage. The sea never was swarming with sub- marines, as the yellow press would have us believe, although Germany did have enough in April, 1917, according to Admiral Sims, to justify her in not building any more. Von Tirpitz, how- ever, reckoned without the depth bomb and the convoy system and never caught up in the race again. Fleet Control Carefully Planned The convoy system had another advantage in that it concentrated the operations, the convoyed fleets being veritable submarine magnets. In other words, it became necessary for the submarine to go to the convoy in order to accomplish his nefarious pur- pose instead of simply lying in wait for single-handed merchantmen at large on the high seas. The convoy system, however, was not as simple as the foregoing outline would in- dicate. Among other things it ‘was necessary to work out the question of fleet control very carefully. As the great convoys left the shores of the United States, one after an- other, they were guided across the ocean from the central operating headquarters in Great Britain in much the same way as a train dispatcher handles the operation of a railroad. The operating headquarters was the focus for endless streams of reports which made it possible to keep tab on the location and movements of prac- tically every submarine operating in the north Atlantic. As these reports were charted and plotted, suitable in- structions were sent by wireless to the various convoy commanders who laid their courses accordingly. The whole task was much like a gigantic game of chess or blind-man’s-buff. The problem of the officers in charge of the operating headquarters was to keep the convoys on courses that were clear of submarines. There were certain broadly specified courses. In detail, however, the courses were constantly changed by wireless accord- ing to the latest information. For in- stance, the convoy on which the writer went to Europe during the latter part ofthe war, turned square about in its tracks one day and retraced its course for three hours. Strange, and apparently senseless, maneuvers of this sort were constantly going on. As the ships left their moorings around New York, one by one, they dropped down the bay and anchored inside the nets off Coney island. Here the fleet assembled. Sometimes a boat would be held at this anchorage for several days. The average delay was about 24 hours. The ships usually sailed out about sundown in great: fleets of from 50 to 60 vessels. These sights, to those who were privileged to witness them, were impressive in the extreme. Painted ships on a painted ocean, their weird camouflage markings splashing in the golden rays of the American sunset, the great fleets of transports and cargo-carriers set forth. During the night they split up into a number of separate convoys for various destinations, or for the same destination, sailing different routes. The convoys usually included about 15 vessels and an effort was made as far as possible to group ships of approximately equal speed. The ships lined up, three or four abreast, in column formation about a half a mile apart. This formation was rigidly maintained all the way across. Precise, accurate navigation, especially at night and in a fog, was required, and in spite of the fact that no lights were allowed, the early morning passenger on deck was unable to dis- cover any change whatever, during the night, in the relative positions of the vessels making up the convoy. The maintenance of proper courses and distances during the night was aided by faint blue lights which were car- ried on the taffrails of some of the vessels in the fleet. These lights were visible only directly astern. When necessary, even these could be switched out. Use of Lights Prohibited Absolutely no ordinary: navigation lights were used and in no cases were cabin lights allowed .to shine out. The storm shutters on every porthole and stateroom window were clamped securely shut from the outside, much to the discomfort of the passengers, mostly soldiers, who, however, seldom grumbled. The doors leading on deck were protected by heavy velvet cur- tains which formed effectual light locks. Of course no smoking was allowed on deck after sunset, and in fact on most ships, no one except members of the crew, sentries and officers actually on duty, were allowed outside of the cabins after 4 bells THE MARINE: REVIEW | 133 or 10 p. m., a necessary precaution. On the American side of the ocean, and for. most of the voyage across, a heavy protecting screen of destroyers was unnecessary. Most of the con- voys made the trip to within 36 hours of the British coast. with only one destroyer and usually one cruiser. The cruiser generally led the proces- sion, taking up a position on the port end of the first line of steamers. The destroyer in this case brought up the rear, on the starboard side of the rear rank. Eastbound and westbound con- voys, of course, followed separate routes in order to avoid collisions. An effort also was made by the operating officers to spread the con- - voys out over the ocean as much as possible so as to make it necessary for the submarines to cover large areas. Fast Runs Impossible The speed of the convoys naturally was slow, owing to the long courses taken, the zigzagging and the necessity for keeping together. The latter con- - dition compelled the faster ships to check down to the speed of the slow- est boat of the fleet. The so-called fast convoys were from 12 to 14 days enroute; other voyages took as many as 20 days. The turnarounds, there- fore, were very slow—unavoidably so —and this increased the already seri- ous shortage of tonnage, with the re- sult that shipping controllers on both sides of the Atlantic sprouted gray hairs rapidly. On account of heavy seas, fogs, engine trouble or other causes, cer- tain ships in the convoys sometimes became separated from their com- panions. In such cases, one of the de- stroyers usually stood by until the fleet was reassembled. : When the so-called danger zone was. reached, each convoy joined up with from 8 to 10 destroyers. These little guardians of the merchantmen then - stayed with their charges right up to the Liverpool bar or into whatever British or French harbor the fleet might be sailing. The junction be- tween the convoy and the group of protecting destroyers was known as a rendezvous. Sometimes the fleet com- mander was given orders for a cer- tain rendezvous at a certain time, before he left New York. On other occasions the time and place of rendezvous were communicated to him by wireless during the voyage. The problem was not only to avoid sub- marines, but to get the ships to the proper rendezvous on time. It was a combat in wits between the operat- ing officers and the submarine com- manders. Usually the submarines were on the losing side. The protecting destroyers formed ° : Si a eed gira ica a oe eames SR LTE. ra, eR Ee epee ee ee ye OZ tat pens