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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law PROVISION of a through bill of lading issued by a railroad com- pany for a shipment toa European port, that the property should be sub- ject to all conditions expressed in the regular forms of bills of lading in use by the steamship company at the time of shipment, is valid and makes the provisions of such ocean bills of lading a part of the contract, it was decided in the case of SUSQUE- HANNA, 291 Federal Reporter 698. The court also held that provisions in ocean bills of lading that the carrier shall not be liable for any claim unless written notice thereof is given before removal of the goods from the wharf, and that no suit therefor shall be maintainable unless instituted within three months after such notice, were reasonable and valid. ek The term “default,” as used in a char- ter party fixing lay days for loading and providing for demurrage for de- tention through “default” of the char- terers, means merely failure to comply with the agreement to complete loading in the specified time, it was held in the case of Ntvose, 291 Federal Reporter 412, and does not embrace all the ex- cuses usually found in standard forms of charter parties in general use. * ok * The master of a barge lying in a slip, though he knew a vessel was coming in and that his barge, with others, would be moved, was held in the case of Acuiturs, 291 Federal Reporter 636, not negligent in failing to keep continuous watch, where the moving did not in- volve any apparent danger. ook Ok The loss of a tow by a tug between Cape Cod canal and Boston was not the proximate result of the captain’s failure to look for storm signals before leav- ing the canal, where the warning dis- played was not such as would have led a reasonably careful nevigator to re- main at the, canal under like circum- stances, it was held in the case of MEr- cury, 291 Federal Reporter 797. A tug, it was further said, is not liable as an insurer or common carrier, but is only held to that degree of care and skill which a reasonably prudent mavi- gator would have exercised under sim- ilar conditions and circumstances. ee ae The principle governing computation of damages caused by collision is that the sufferer by the collision which is the re- sult of wrongdoing, whether by negli- gence or mistake, is entitled to restitutio in integrum. It is that, as far as prac- ticable, the owner is to be restored to the same pecuniary position as if no collision had taken place, and where a ship is totally lost the owner is entitled to recover the actual value, and this is defined in the admiralty courts to be her market value; that is to say, the gross sum for which she might have been sold im- mediately before the collision. That a vessel, when sunk in collision in war time, was under requisition to the gov- ernment, does not affect the fact that the monetary loss, which was that of the owner, was her then market value, and, if that value was enhanced by reason of war conditions, he is entitled to such enhanced value, since nothing less would be restitution. Where, at the time of the loss of the vessel, there was no market value, because war, conditions prevented there being vessels in the market, the measure of damages for the loss is the cost of reproduction, less depreciation; enhanced prices of shipbuilding, due to war conditions, while unusual, were not artificial or fictitious, but actual, and must be considered in computing the cost of reproduction of a ship lost in colli- sion during that time—CusHINnc, 292 Federal Reporter 560. * * * Presumption of unseaworthiness alone will sustain a recovery in a case where a vessel sinks or brings about a collision from an unknown cause, where nothing but her unseaworthiness can explain the accident. “The presumption of: unsea- worthiness arises where the only in- ference in the circumstances is that of unseaworthiness,” where the circum- stances surrounding the accident exclude all other inferable causes——CitTy or CAM- DEN, 292 Federal Reporter 93. * * * In the case of PrupeNcE, 292 Federal Reporter 371, it was held that a tug, with two barges in tow tandem, and _ the second barge were in fault for a colli- sion between the latter and an anchored schooner, when entering Maurice river, New Jersey, at night, the tug for not navigating with reasonable care to avoid the schooner, whose lights she saw when 1%4 miles away, and for not shorten- ing her towing lines on entering the river, and the barge for not keeping a lookout. * * * The merchant marine act of June 5, 1920, section 33, giving a legal remedy to injured seaman, is limited in appli- cation to navigable waters of the United States, and is not unconstitutional as an attempted interference with intrastate commerce over ‘waters of a state—Mc- Cullough v. Jannson, 292 Federal Reporter 3/7, sok Oe “Assuming,” said the court in the case of Oweco, 292 Federal Reporter 403, 20 “that the owner of a lighter may be entitled to a lien in some cases, it does not follow that the lien exists in every case. Usually lighterage is a charge on the cargo, and the lighterman would have his lien on that.. If the lighter was hired by the agent of the ship and then merely stood by, or if, after her use had terminated, through negligence she was not promptly returned, no lien would be created for the time she was actually serving the ship. Not every maritime contract creates a lien.” * * * The ship mortgage act of June 5, 1920, section 30, is intended for the protection of the actual laborer, and does not apply to the lien of a contracting stevedore. “The reason for this,” it was said in the case of Oweco, 292 Federal Reporter 403, “is clear. A laborer could not be expected to make inquiries and to inspect the ship’s papers before doing a day’s work. The same reason does not apply to a contracting stevedore. He is in the same position as material men and repairmen whose liens are not preferred to a prior mortgage, and he is entitled to no greater rights.” * * * “The stipulations in a bill of lading limiting the time within which to pre- sent claim for loss or damage and with- in which to bring an action, if reasonable, is binding. * * * While the negotiation for compromise of claim, it seems, does not waive the contract of limitation, nor surrender the right of a bar which had already fallen, it is settled, however, that where all of the benefits of notice are placed before the carrier as fully as should be done by a formal notice, the necessity for the formal notice is ob- viated. Especially is this the case where the carrier, with the aid of the shipper, has made an examination of the nature and extent of the injury, and has ob- tained as full information as a notice would have disclosed.”"—-HrEnry S. Grove, 292 Federal Reporter 502. * * * “The mere booking stipulations,” it was declared in the case of Henry S. Grove, 292 Federal Reporter 502, “do not pre- clude the issuance or acceptance of a bill of lading by the shipper as express- ing the terms of the agreement between them, and when this is done both the parties are bound by its provisions.” * * * A seaman is one “who can hand, reef, and steer;” a mariner in the full sense. The seaman is not charged with any re- sponsibility with relation to the seaworthi- ness of a vessel, nor is a seaman in that sense a person employed in loading and unloading the vessel.—Oweco, 292 Federal Reporter 505.