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Marine Review (Cleveland, OH), February 1926, p. 24

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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review | By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law HE owner of a moored vessel, which was cast adrift by an em- ployee without his authority, was held, in the case of No. C-4, 300 Fed- eral Reporter 757, not to be liable for a resulting collision. * Eo HE fact that the owner of a scow was engaged in dredging work for the government, as a private contractor, does not change the rule making it evidence of negligence to tie up his boat. at the end of a pier when not at work, so as to unduly ' ebstruct entrance to a slip.—F. J. No. 28, 300 Federal Reporter 805. * * & RTICLE 16 of international & rules, requiring moderate speed in a fog and careful regard to exist- ing circumstances and _ conditions, govern the navigation of war vessels in time of war. ‘Moderate speed,” required in a fog, it was decided in New York & Cuba Mail Steamship Co. v. United States, 300 Federal Re- porter 827, means speed so slow that the vessel can be stopped within the distance at which another vessel can be seen, having regard to the. fog density. * * a HE circumstances entitled to most consideration in: all cases relating to salvage are: The value cf the property saved, the extent of; the service rendered, the degree of merit and gallantry displayed, and the danger to which the vessel was exposed and from which it was saved. “A general rule is,” it was said in the case of Atlantic Refining Co., v. Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co., 300 Federal Reporter 901, “that a liberal award commensu- rate with the service rendered in the emergency should be allowed, such an award as will encourage and stim- ulate similar service by others.” LL furnishers of repairs’ or supplies. are required always to make inquiry, whether or not they know facts which would lead them to think that the vessel was not owned by the company operating it. The furnisher need go no further in his investigation if he finds out that the person ordering the repairs or supplies is the owner or his agent, unless he has reasonable grounds to suppose that the owner was in possession un- der an agreement for purchase which forbade the imposition of liens. In the latter case he must use reasonable diligence to discover the terms of the agreement for purchase. — United States v. Certain Subfreights Due Steamship NEPONSET, 300 Federal Reporter 981. ‘transported to destination; ‘N THE absence of law, contract or usage to the contrary, or partnership agreement between con- necting carriers or joint contract for transportation, the liability of the ini- tial carrier, although the goods are marked for a point beyond its line, terminates when it transports the goods to the end of its line and de- livers to a connecting carrier, to be and, ac- cording to the case of Vital v. Kerr, 297 Federal Reporter 959, Act of June 29, 1906, amending interstate com- merce act of Feb. 4, 1887, does not affect the liability as between con- necting carriers, where the shipment was from outside the United States to a foreign country, and simply involved a transshipment at New York, with- out any carriage of the goods from one state through another state of the United States. ae * we STAUNCH and _ seaworthy ves- sel should carry the full cargo which her measurements and tonnage entitle her to carry, and a charterer of a vessel has a right to expect her to carry such a load. If she is unable to carry that amount of ‘cargo because of any weakness, she must be deemed unseaworthy. Un- seaworthiness is a comparative term. A vessel may be perfectly seaworthy for cargo-carrying purposes around the harbor, and not be seaworthy for oceanic carriage; and she may be seaworthy for the carriage of a load of lumber, and not be seaworthy for a load of steel rails. The law implies a warranty by the owner *** of sea- worthiness for the purposes for which the SAGAMORE was chartered. The warrantor of the ability of the ves- sel to carry her full capacity of the freight contemplated by the parties is responsible for its failure so _ to do. ***-A vessel being unseaworthy, liability cannot be escaped without the clear showing that the disaster was bound to have happened despite the unseaworthiness, and this burden rests on the owner. Therefore the charterer, as bailee, did not breach the contract to return the ship in good order and condition.—SAGAMORE, 300 Federal Reporter 701. * # VESSEL, overtaking another in a narrow channel, had to re- spect the rights and position of the other, it was held in the case of EN- ERGETIC, 297 Federal Reporter 670, un- less the other either violated some rule of navigation herself, and thereby caused the collision, or in some way led the overtaking vessel into a trap. 24 HERE a tug was employed as mere motive power of a tow, and both vessels were exclusively under control of a pilot not compul- sorily employed by the master, fault will not be imputed to the tug for collision with a draw and abutments of a bridge, provided the tug was properly equipped and seaworthy, it was decided in the case of the United States v. Port of Portland, 300 Fed- eral Reporter 724. “It would like- wise be the duty of the master,” said the court, “to advise the pilot of any facts which would assist him in the movement of the ship. The master, however, could not navigate the ship, for the very purpose of taking the pilot was to put the ship under the control of one specially in- formed concerning the tides, currents, channels, and other conditions of the harbor.” * * * W HEN operators had full knowl- edge of the restraints imposed by a foreign government and the space available, and the shipper has no such knowledge, and goods were transported to be shipped to the point of embark- ment at a great expense, the defense of restraint of princes is unconscion- able and cannot be sustained in an ac- tion, for damages for breach of con- tract. The restraint of princes clause, it was declared in the case of Rotter- damsche Lloyd v. Gosho Co., 298 Federal Reporter 4438, relates to fu- ture restraints, not to restraints al- ready existing. The undertaking of the carrier is that he will transport the freight, unless restrained by some future act of government, not that he will transport if present restraints are removed. os oo mK HERE a steamship’s equipment. offered by contractor did not con- form to the contract, the ship was not bound to accept same, nor to await repair thereof, where to do so would delay the vessel, with consequent dam- age.—NEW ROCHELLE, 298 Federal Re- porter 525. * % * HERE bills of lading author- ized a vessel to deviate from the direct route between the ports of shipment and destination, and pro- vided that the carrier should not be liable for any loss or damage caused by prolongation of the vessel, it is not liable for damage to a cargo of grain caused by failure to deliver it within what would have been a reasonable time for a direct voyage.—Florida Grain & Elevator Co., v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 300 Federal Reporter 169.

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