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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law HERE a collision is due to the negligence of both colliding ships, the damage to each should be equally divided. ANNA, 297 Federal Reporter 182. s * * HE court ruled in the WEST . HARTLAND case, 297 Federal Re- porter 330, that in proceedings for limitation of liability for collision damages, the measure of the owner’s liability is the value of the vessel immediately after the collision from which he may claim only for money necessarily expended to preserve her from loss or destruction; and where the owner has made extensive repairs since the collision, he may obtain the benefit of such expenditure by sur- rendering the ship’s appraised value immediately after the collision; but if he elects to surrender the ship he can- not assert a prior lien on the pro- ceeds for the cost of such repairs. * * * NVOICE value,” as used in a bill of lading limiting a shipowner’s liability, means the amounts written into the invoices taken as of the time of shipment; the phrase differs from “invoice price” only in the fact that the terms of sale maw require dis- counts from the prices to arrive at present value. Duties cannot be in- cluded. When freight is prepaid, it becomes part of the value, but it can- not be regarded as part of the “invoice value.”—Anchor Line, Ltd., v. Jackson, 9 F. (2d) 548. * * * HERE a bill of lading is silent as to the place of stowage, the law implies that the contract is for earriage of the goods under deck or in the ordinary carrying space of the ship.”—Transatlantic Shipping Co., Inc., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine In- surance Co., 9 F. (2d) 720. * * * ROVISION of a steamship ticket sold in Boston for transportation from Montreal to Liverpool, exempt- ing the shipowner from liability for negligence, was contrary to public policy and unenforceable in courts of the United States, notwithstanding further provisions that all questions arising under that paragraph of the contract should be decided according to the English law, under which such exemption clause was valid; an agree- ment made in the United States con- trary to public policy is absolutely void and unenforceable, no matter how solemnly it may be made.— Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Cor- coran, 9 F, (2d) 724. 24 N THE absence of some agreement to the contrary, a voyage must be commenced without needless de- lay, and must be prosecuted without unnecessary delay or deviation. The shipowner’s agreement is that he will be diligent in transporting the goods to their destination, and that he will do so without unnecessary deviation.” —Dietrich v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 9 F. (2d) 738. *k * * ROVISION stamped on bill of lad- ing. “The shippers being satisfied with the stowage and with the condi- tions of carriage, release ship from all responsibility -for deterioration of the said goods,” is void, and ineffec- tive to bar a recovery for damage to the cargo.—Skipsea, 9 F. (2d) 887. * * 6 tae ASCERTAIN the _ proximate cause of a collision, inquiry must be made whether there is an unbro- ken connection between the act and the injury; that is, whether the negli- gent act caused the injury. An in- tervening act is not the proximate cause of the injury, unless it is eff- cient to break the casual connection. An overtaking vessel, negligent in navigating too close to a vessel ahead in a narrow channel without attempt- ing to pass, it was held in the case of Pleiades, 9 F. (2d) 804, was not liable for a collision when the cur- rent suddenly caused the overtaken vessel to sheer, proximately causing the collision. It was said, further, that an overtaking vessel is not bound to anticipate improper naviga- tion by the overtaken vessel, and that the overtaking vessel, not intending to pass the overtaken vessel, is not required to give a signal. The over- taking vessel must bear the conse- quences of her own injury, if she makes the mistake in assuming a position too close to an overtaken vessel in a narrow channel, resulting in a collision when the overtaken vessel suddenly sheered because of the current. % * * HARFAGE charges for the per- iod when a vessel is receiving and landing passengers, or loading or unloading freight, constitute a maritime lien; but a contract for wharfage of a vessel withdrawn from navigation is not maritime, it was de- clared in the case of Poznan, 9 F. (2d) 838, and will not support a mari- time lien, defined as an appropriation of a ship as a security for a debt or claim; it is given by the law, and it gives the creditor a special proper- ty in the ship, which subsists from the moment the debt arises, and _ it gives him a right to have the ship MARINE REVIEW—May, 1927 sold that his debt may be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. * Ed * PASSENGER, who had a con- tract for a Mediterranean cruise, was entitled to every precaution for his personal safety, and to respect- ful treatment from the manager of the excursion and its servants, and to protection from violence and _ insult, from whatever source arising, it was held in the case of Raymond & Whit- comb Co. v. Ebsary, 9 F. (2d) 889, but damages to such passenger sus- tained by improper act of cruise man- ager in prohibiting him from going on a side tour must be confined to pecuniary injury sustained; shock, distress, or humiliation of another does not enter into damages suffered. ‘oe « Gass negligence of a tug causing collision between tows’ is_ not merged in the negligence of the tow’s bargemaster in failing to take steps to prevent sinking, so as to preclude recovery of damages attributable to the collision; where a tow slightly damaged by a collision due to a tug’s negligence, sunk due to negligence of person in charge in failing to prompt- ly beach or siphon her, only damages due to collision were recoverable.— J. G. Rosn, 9 F. (2d) 917. * * * Wits the right of a master to demote a seaman on voyage, es- pecially in a harbor, in the absence of the ‘approval of the consul of the ship’s country, may be questioned, said the court in the case of ROSEMARY, 9 F. (2d) 980, still to do so was rea- sonable, where the seaman (mate) had been injured. BS * Lo EVIATION is the highest form of negligence, it was said in Fass v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 9 F. (2d) 1004; and in the case of Western Lumber Mfg. Co. v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 1004, the court held that de- viation deprives the carrier of all ex- emptions, statutory or otherwise, and the master’s negligent operation of the vessel during deviation does not bring loss within the provisions of the Harter act, relieving owner of liability for errors in navigation. It was further decided that even if an unauthorized deviation without in- tent to convert goods constitutes con- version, the shipper must manifest an intention to rescind the contract; on no theory may he demand the value of the goods, treating them as the property of the carrier, and at the same time exact damages for a breach of a contract to carry and de- liver them.