Merchant Marine Needed . (Continued from Page 11) chantman, always remembering that foreign wars may deprive us of the ships which we were using in our trade. In the second kind of a war, fought in foreign territory, and _ territory means the sea as well as the land, the logical sequence of events would be 1. Gain command of the sea. 2. Maintain control of the sea. 38. Occupy with troops the neces- sary enemy territory. In each of these the navy and the merchant marine are _ inextricably joined and, indeed, until command of the sea is established, the merchant marine has no chance safely and un- interruptedly to carry on its normal commercial mission. So from the be- ginning of the war it is assisting in establishing its own freedom and safety. Let us suppose that the United States is at war with a country 2500 miles away from our own coast and that she desires to keep the war away from home. To do this she must be ready to take the offensive immedi- ately. This, does not mean that the armed forces of the country are main- tained for offensive purposes or that the government maintains a_ political offensive. As has frequently been stated by public men—the armed forces are maintained to defend the United States—but the best defense on the outbreak of war is an immedi- ate military offensive. To conduct such an offensive it is necessary to send a fleet overseas where it can attack the enemy fleet. in its own waters. The passage of this fleet is no small matter. The fleet will consist of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, airplane carriers, aeroplanes, submarines, minelayers and mine sweepers. In the fleet will be a large number of auxiliary vessels in which will be included repair ships, fuel ships, hospital ships, ammunition ships and store ships, the latter to car- ry provisions, clothing, spare parts and other material to maintain the fleet. Such a fleet might well consist of 200 naval vessels and 50,000 men. Enroute to its destination the fleet would be subject to enemy attack and after arrival would still be sub- ject to such attack. The fleet could not arrive in enemy territory and cruise about waiting for something to happen. Once arrived, it would have to establish itself so that it could car- ry out its further work, perhaps over a long period. The obvious way to accomplish this 50 is to get rid of the vessels that do not fight, placing them under the best possible protection and endeavor- ing to gain this protection at the minimum sacrifice of fighting ships. This can best be done by the estab- lishment of a base in or near the enemy territory, where the non-fight- ing ships may be reasonably secure and where the fighting ships may go for repairs, fueling, provisioning and for release of strain on the person- nel. The ideal base would then be a little bit of the United States moved close to the enemy country, but with this difference: In the United States the base could be supplied by land, while the base we have established can only be supplied by water. Plans for the establishment of such a base would necessitate the trans- portation of troops, perhaps marines, perhaps soldiers, with the fleet. The protection of the base must be as independent as possible of the fight- ing navy afloat, which must be left free to establish command of the sea. Soon or late an expeditionary force would be sent to enemy territory, in- volving naval protection and a vast number of transports. Then the navy, through its base, and the expeditionary force must be kept supplied from home with the innumerable supplies and necessities that are vital to its existence. So the beginning of a campaign has been outlined, such campaign being based on the assumption that it is more economical and more efficient in every way to fight the war away from home. There is one more feature to be con- sidered—our foreign commerce. Dur- ing the war the resources of the coun- try will be primarily devoted to the efficient maintenance of our military and naval forees—but, with command of the sea, our commerce will not be dead, and will indeed be our only source of financial revenue outside the United States. In the planning of such a cam- paign the navy department and the war department, in fact, the whole government, is immediately con- fronted by the question, “Where can we get ships?” The navy in its in- itial overseas campaign has not suf- ficient ships to maintain itself. No navy could have such ships. Not only would the cost be prohibitive, but such ships are not necessary as a part of the navy in time of peace if they can be quickly obtained in time of war. The only source of supply of such ships in war is the merchant marine, which in times of peace, is a financial asset MARINE REVIEW—October, 1927 to the country, and, in time of war, a military necessity to the army and navy. In our campaign, merchant ships appear from the beginning. In the overseas campaign they carry the supplies for the transportation of which the ships of the navy are in- sufficient. They carry the troops which are to occupy the base. They keep the base, and through it, the navy, supplied with the necessities of war. When the expeditionary force goes overseas it is carried by the merchant marine and when the force is established it is supplied by the merchant marine. Finally the mer- chant marine, assured of safety through the work of its ships in the navy and army, carries on the coun- try’s foreign trade. No statistics are necessary to show that a great number of merchant ships are necessary to the military forces of a country for the successful prosecu- tion of a war. They become an inte- gral part of the army and of the navy and the strength of the merchant marine must be included in the study of the military strength of any na- tion. People today are prone to think in the present. Having just ended one war it is hard for us to think of a future war. We have forgotten the vast sums expended in the World war that could have been saved had much smaller: sums been carefully spent in preparation, or, as has so often been said, in insurance. If another war comes it will not be as simple. We shall not have as much time to get ready; so why neglect this one form of preparation, of insurance— that is not only a war time neces- sity but a peace time asset—the mer- chant marine? Converted Diesel Ships Make Better Speed Though the diesel ships converted from steam under the shipping board’s program are not designed to have the speed which is now becoming in- creasingly popular, it is interesting to note that the motorship City oF RAYVILLE operated for the board by the Roosevelt Steamship Co. in the Australia-India service made the voy- age from Balboa to Brisbane, a dis- tance of 7693 miles in 26 days, 5 hours and 16 minutes averaging 12.26 knots. . The motorship SAwoxua operated by the same company, in loaded con- dition on her last eastward voyage, made a run of 822 miles during 24 hours, an average of 13.76 knots.