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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law UOTING from the case of Thomas Bell & Co. Ltd., v. Stewart, 31 F. (2d) 44: “The terms of the charter party determine the proper person to receive notice of arrival and readi- ness to discharge as between the owner and the charterer, and, as be- tween them, the charter party con- trols the bills of lading ***, when there is a conflict between them. In this case, the bills of lading prescribe notice both to the consignee and to Angevine; the charter party is silent as to Angevine. So far as concerns the giving of the notice of arrival and readiness to discharge after hav- ing passed the customs, the charter party controlled, and notice to the consignee alone _Sufficed. * fs A CONSIGNEE, solely at fault for dumping of cargo and damages to a scow because moored in an un- safe berth, was liable to the con- signor for the value of the cargo and primarily liable to the owner of the scow for damages to the scow, it was held in the case of Goodwin-Gallagher Sand & Gravel Corp., v. Washing- ton Bulkley, Inc., 31 F. (2d) 112. The consignor it was declared, being liable to the owner of the scow under charter party for return of scow in the same condition as received ex- cept, ordinary wear and tear, was secondarily liable for damages to the ScOW. ES * * IENS for repairs, supplies, or other necessaries furnished to a vessel, are entitled to priority over a common-law mortgage, under the ship mortgage act, which act de- stroys any distinction between home and foreign ports, said the court in the case of LITTLE CHARLEY, 31 F. (2d) 120. Furthermore, all liens of the same class, accruing within the same year, are entitled to share equally in the proceeds in the reg- istry from the sale of the vessel, and are prior to liens accruing in any preceding year. * * HE fishing vessel, COMMONWEALTH (case reported in 31 F. (2d) 142), was well constructed, was equipped ac- cording to the accepted standards for such vessels, was in charge of an ex- perienced master, and was _ fully outfitted with the appliances for ex- tinguishing fires, giving distress sig- nals, and otherwise meeting emerg- encies that might reasonably be con- templated on the seas. “The owners’ duty,” said the court, “did not require them to provide a vessel of fireproof construction, or to adopt all the latest avpliances, or the best safety devices. The equipment and appliances need . 42 only be what is reasonably safe for the purpose. This duty is satisfied if a reasonably staunch and fit vessel is provided, sufficiently equipped for the uses to which the vessel is to be put.” *k ok * N THE case of BUCKLEIGH, 31 F. (2d) 241, it appears that though the ship named could not get her true bearings in a dense fog, she went on at full speed, practically relying only on dead reckoning to shape _ her course. In the circumstances, said the court, she should have proceeded more slowly by the aid of accurate soundings taken with a deliberation that was impossible when going at high speed, and if, as seems to have been the case, she did not know her position, she should have anchored until the fog abated and she could navigate safely. Her navigation was negligent. * ES * HE liberty clauses of a bill of lad- ing, providing that a ship shall have liberty to deviate for the pur- pose of saving life or property and with liberty to call at intermediate ports, does not excuse the failure to make the vessel seaworthy for the en- tire voyage. This clause is not under- stood to permit a call which is not customarily a port of call for the vessel. The clause does not release the ship from performance of any of her ordinary duties in preparing for the voyage, nor does it authorize the ship to sail voluntarily from the port of departure with a shortage of coal, and create the necessity for calling at intermediate ports not mentioned in the bill of lading and contrary to the customary course of the voy- age.—CALEDONIER, 31 F. (2d 257. EY *k * @ Beles is such an obligation upon a seaman to obey the orders of his superiors that he cannot have the freedom of action which lies at the base of the doctrine of assumption of risk as applied to workmen on land. It was held, therefore, in the case of Masjulis v. United States shipping board emergency fleet corporation, 31 F. (2d) 284, that a seaman does: not’ assume the risk of-using a rope under orders, notwithstanding his objection to its sufficiency, rather than assume the risk of disobedience. * ok Bot parties to the case of Mor- row Steamship Co. v. Superior Water, Light & Power Co., 31 F. (2d) 486, were held at fault for the col- lision of a steamer owned by the first- named with a cable belonging to the latter undergoing repairs. the former because the steamer failed to delay MARINE REVIEW—J anuary, 1930 her turning movement until the power company’s employes could clear the cable from the channel, and the power company for leaving its employes with inefficient equipment to properly keep the channel clear. * * ES ROVISION in a bill of lading that — the carrier shall not be liable for any claim for loss or damage, unless notice of such claim is given before removal of goods from carrier’s cus- tody and control, is not unreasonable, and a consignee not giving such no- tice is not entitled to recover, not- withstanding a notation of damage on the receipt for shipment.—T. D. Duche & Sons y. Lloyd Mediterraneo, 31 F. (2d) 496. * % * HE maritime law is not so ex- clusive as to prevent recovery under the workmen’s compensation acts of the states in all cases of ac- cident on navigable waters, it was said in the case of Employers’ Lia- bility Assurance Corp. Ltd., v. Cook, — 31 F. (2d) 497; the rules of the mari- time law may be modified by state statutes providing compensation for employes, where such statutes con- cern purely local matters and work no material prejudice to the maritime law. * * * HEN a charter party is for a term of “about six months,” or other stated period, the use of the word “about” is interpreted as signi- fying an intention to allow the chart- erer a reasonable leeway in respect to the date on which the vessel shall be surrendered. It is a recognition, based on the necessities of practical business, that her voyages cannot be planned so accurately as to bring her home on an exact date, and that the parties have contemplated the possibility of a reasonable shortening or lengthening of the stated term. Hence, if a voy- age terminate in a port of redelivery before the end of the stated term, the charterer may require the vessel to make another “reasonable” voyage; even though it is certain to overlap the stated term. If, however, the time remaining before the end of the stated term is so short as to render another voyage “unreasonable,” then the vessel may be surrendered by the charterer, or withdrawn by the owner; thus creating an underlap. Where the charterer is privileged to make 4 voyage which will result in an over- lap, and actually makes it, he must pay hire at the charter rate until re- delivery.—Britain Steamship Co. Ltd. _ v. Munson Steamship line, 31 F. (2d) 5