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\ Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law Specially Compiled for Marine Review N UNDERSTANDING that the terms of an undertaking exoner- ated a tug owner from responsibility for any accident resulting from put- ting a barge in place cannot exoner- ate such owner from the _ responsi- bility of a mishap resulting, not pri- marily from the conditions over which he had no control, but from the faul- ty carrying out of the undertaking as- sumed.—Vim, 40 F. (2d) 638. * * HILST it is settled law that, as between the right of traffic over a drawbridge or swinging bridge crossing navigable waters of the United States and the right of navi- gation through those waters, the right of navigation is the paramount right, and must not be unreasonably ob- structed by delay in opening the bridge, the rights are necessarily, to a large extent, correlative, it was stated in the case of Newtown Creek Towing Co. v. City of New York, 40 (2d) 649, and a vessel using the waters and desiring to pass through the bridge should not only signal in timely fashion to the bridge, but should approach it at such speed as, under the tidal and other conditions then existing, will give the bridge time to open. * * * M2 contact between two ships, when a ship in tow was enter- ing a slip, does not of itself establish negligence of the tug.—OrTsrgo, 40 F. (2d) 925. € * * * AMAGES to be recovered from party at fault for a collision shall be sufficient to restore the injured ves- sel to the condition in which she was at the time the collision occurred. This damage is not affected by the fact that temporary repairs were made, and it can be proven by expert testi- mony, although the work is never actually done——B. F. Guinan, 40 F. (20): 277. * e € NIGHT watchman, transported to a scow on a tug under con- tract, was not a passenger, but he was entitled to reasonably safe means for leaving the tug at the place where he was to work.—Ross Copprneron, 40 F. (2d) 280. * * * N THE case of Bellaire, Benwood & Wheeling Ferry Co. v. Interstate Bridge Co., 40 F. (2d) 323, it was held: “The power of congress to regulate the use of navigable waters is unques- tioned. * * Likewise the power of con- gress over navigation is supreme. The courts will take judicial notice * * of the fact that bridges cannot be con- 92 structed over navigable streams except by the authorization of congress. * * The Ohio river is a navigable stream.” * * * N THE case of St. Louis Coke & Iron Co. v. Goltra, 41 F. (2d) 134, it appeared that the company con- tracted for transporting 10,000 tons of coal by barges, which contract was en- tered into in view of labor troubles and a strike of railroad switchmen, and that the company’s needs were not fully supplied by cars, and that is assigned as reason for not loading barges that the coal was not forth- coming owing to lack of an under- standing with the coal company. The carrier incurred large expense in as- sembling and manning barges and transporting them for loading. The court held that, under the circum- stances, the company owed a duty of utmost good faith not to purposely defeat the transportation of coal, and _that the company was liable for dam- ages for failure to furnish coal for transportation. It was also decided that a breach by the carrier in fail- ing to have barges in place for load- ing in time was waived by the ship- per by inducing the carrier to re- main after the arrival of the barges, pending negotiations for coal delivery. * * * HERE persons on a tug in the Houston ship channel did not hear fog signals blown by a vessel proceeding down the channel, the presumption may be indulged, said the court in the case of LuTcHER Brown, 41 F. (2d) 176, that such per- sons were not attending strictly to their duties. Ey] * ” HERE a fuel tank of a vessel had been subjected to two Lloyd’s surveys within preceding two years, the owners of the vessel, it was declared in the case of E. I. Du- pont De Nemours & Co., Ine. v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 41 F. (2d) 226, cannot be held to be bound to apply a pressure test to all fuel tanks of the vessel prior to com- mencement of a voyage, in the ab- sence of facts putting them on notice of leakage. * * * T HE charterer is liable for any dam- age to the boat resulting from his own negligence or the negligence of any one to whom he intrusts her. The burden of proving negligence is upon the owner, but he makes out a prima facie case if he can go no further than to show that the boat was damaged during the charter period, and then the burden of explanation, or, as it is sometimes said, of carrying on, lies upon the charterer. In the absence of MARINE REview—April, 1931 exculpatory evidence a presumption of negligence arises against him. This is the established law as to the obli- gation of the bailee in bailments for hire.—Moran No. 10, 41 F. (2d) 255, * * & N ADMIRALTY the rule is well set- tled, said the court in the case of Puget Sound Navigation Co. y. Nel- son, 41 F. (2d) 356, that a vessel com- mitting a breach of statutory duty must not only show that probably her fault did not contribute to the disas- ter, but that it could not have done so. It was also pointed out by the court that the doctrine in admiralty of an equal division of damages in the case of a collison between two vessels, when both are in fault contributing to the collision, has long prevailed in England and this country. But at common law the general rule is that, if both vessels are culpable in respect of faults operating directly and for injuries so caused. * * * HILE it is of course true that a vessel must furnish a safe place in which workmen are required to perform their services and also a rea- sonably safe passage to and from such place, nevertheless, when it has employed an independent contractor to load and stow the cargo, and has turned the ship over to the contractor in a safe condition, then it is relieved of any fault that may arise through the work of the servants of the con- tractor; the rule being that a vessel in charge of stevedores or independent contractors is not liable in admiralty to such stevedores or independent contractors, or to their employes, for injuries, unless a contractual relation exists between the vessel and the per- son injured, or on account of the fail- ure on the part of the owner, or those in charge of the navigation of the vessel, to perform maritime duty or obligation, as a result of which injur- ies are received.—Long v. Silver line, Ltd., 41 F. (2d) 367. * * EY N THE case of Augusta W. SNOW, 41 F. (2d) 377, it was brought out that a contract for the sale of a ves sel was drawn without the assistance of legal advice and that stipulations in such contract should be given meaning which would have the ee of denying to the purchaser the ar to suffer or permit a lien. The oo, held that the fact that the or was drawn by a layman wou justify the court in giving a ve and unnatural meaning to the on language of the contract, and it ihe decided that such contract did oe withhold from the purchaser right to incur liens on the vessel.