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mine proved to be the essential fac- tor in the victory. At an enormous sacrifice the British people had made themselves supreme on the sea in a military sense and action at sea was their traditional role. But in addi- tion, for the first time in history, they were also called upon to mo- bilize as a great military power and finally had to put 10,000,000 men under arms on shore, to furnish mu- nitions to their own as well as al- lied armies and navies, to act as the financiers of their partners and to supply them with sea transport. Then came the Washington con- ference for the limitations of naval armaments. Agreement was reached for equality of tonnage in capital ships for the United States and the British Empire, and failure to agree to apply these ratios to cruisers and other auxiliaries, it being contended . that on account of the world wide responsibilities of the British fleet more cruisers were needed than for any other country. This position was generally maintained at the con- ference at Geneva in 1927. At the London naval conference in 1930, however, this attitude was abandoned and equality with United States in cruisers and other auxiliary vessels was agreed to by treaty. The author suggests that it may have been wise to go on without reference to United States or Japan, the latter at that time a British ally. The British Merchant Navy Returning to the merchant navy the author states that it as well as the Royal navy has suffered a partial eclipse since the beginning of the present century and that the cause has been much the same. Other na- tions have awakened to the value of sea carrying power as an auxiliary to sea figthing power and as an eco- nomic instrument. This the author believes goes some way to expose the motives of the Americans. Nar- row nationalism has supported the suggestion that each country should carry, if not all at any rate a larger proportion of its seaborne trade, as though it were possible to differen- tiate between the claims of the buyer and the seller of goods in the mat- ter of transport. A deaf ear has been turned to the impregnable truths that the seas are all one and that the greatest good of the great- est number lies in freedom of ac- cess to the world’s freight markets with efficiency and cheapness of sery- ice as the basis of a healthy compe- tition on the important trade routes, even if, at a heavy cost to producers and consumers, a coastal trade be reserved to the national flag. Whatever the causes the British merchant navy has suffered a par- tial eclipse because other nations have added to their merchant fleets by various expedients which may be loosely described as navigation laws. 20 It is a misconception, the author points out, to believe that the Brit- ish navigation laws of past centuries were the foundations of this coun- try’s predominance at sea at the be- ginning of this century. At one time these laws may have served a useful purpose because of the con- ditions prevailing when they were enacted, but by the time of their final repeal in the middle of the last century the British merchant navy, exempt for many years from healthy competition, was languish- ing. The ships were for the most part badly found, badly navigated and badly manned. The fortunes of British shipping were at a low ebb. The impetus that came from com- petition was apparent in the growth of the merchant navy after the re- peal of the navigation laws, and British tonnage nearly trebled be- tween 1835 and 1874. In the latter years of the nine- teenth century the merchant navy vindicated its position as an inter- national instrument of sea transport, in 1900 accounting for 45.7 per cent of the world’s tonnage with its 8914 vessels of 13,241,000 tons gross. At this period British shipowners were carrying, (1). Practically the whole of the coasting trade of the United Kingdom. (2). Ninety per cent of the trade between the United Kingdom -and the Empire. (3). More than one-half the trade between the United Kingdom annd foreign countries. (4). About one-half of the remaining trade of the world. The British merchant navy came out of the war with loses aggregating 7,- 830,855 tons and without adequate funds for making good these losses ex- cept by drawing on pre-war reserve. Sir Norman Hill has calculated that the replacement cost exceeded the in- Editor's Note HIS abstract of a most interest- ing paper is printed because of its importance in representing the point of view probably widely held in the greatest mari- time country of the world. It is something to ponder on, even though we cannot agree to the assumption that Great Britain, admitting its peculiar position, should assume dominance in na- val and merchant marine power. Our own geographical position and great and growing commerce entitles us to a position of strength on the seas and this we must attain if we are to progress along the lines of our destiny. SUSIE AS AMEE NE PIE SO HERA: EEL EDEN LE PSTN ATE DNR PT EER AEA MARINE REVIEW—May, 1931 surance money received by £187,000, 000. Crippled by the war the British shipping industry has done little more than replace tonnage destroyed. Bx. pansion has been checked by the mis. taken policy of successive chancellors of the exchequer during and after the war. The growth of merchant navies of other countries on the other hanq has proceeded at accelerated pace. Present British Merchant Marine In considering the position’ of the British merchant navy today there are three notable developments which can- not be ignored: (1) In 1900 there were no motorships. Today motorships are of 7,816,000 tons gross, which is 11.2 per cent of the total tonnage existing. Of this motorship tonnage 2,421,000 tons, or 10.3 per cent, of the British tonnage, flies the British flag, while 11.7 per cent is under foreign flags, suggesting that British shipowners have been less quick than some of their rivals to adopt this new means of propulsion. (2) In 1900 there were 6,588,000 tons gross of sailing ships which was 22.8 per cent of. the total tonnage; there were 2,112,000 tons, or 14.8 per cent under the British flag, and 4,476,000 tons, or 30.2 per cent, under foreign flags, a proof that Brit- ish owners were adopting steam pro- pulsion more rapidly than their for- eign competitors. (3) In 1900 there were practically no tankers. In 1930, 7,536,000 tons gross, or 10.8 per cent of the tonnage afloat, were tankers. Of the British tonnage 2,402,000 tons or 10.3 per cent were tankers, and the foreign tonnage 5,134,000 tons, or 11.1 per cent. With reference to the merchant navy the author points out conditions are abnormal, owing to the direct or in- direct state aid in the United States, France, Italy and other foreign coun- tries. There is no suggestion that these foreign ships are needed because there is already too much tonnage of all de- scriptions afloat with the result that more vessels of every nationality are idle than ever before. How long this policy of spoon-feeding will be pur- sued at the expense of the tax payers of the countries concerned, it is im- possible to foresee. There is no prece- dent to aid in forecasting the course of events. Nationalization of shipping having proved a conspicuous failure, another experiment is being tried— subsidies. He then goes on to say if state aided shipbuilding persists other countries may be forced by their own necessities to fall into line with those who are denying the first principles of the eco- nomic law which in earlier years of this century were honored everywhere. There is one last and permanent fac- tor. The people of Great Britain and Ireland, as islanders, are shipmen, liv- ing at the center of a worldwide oceanic empire, a people of great tra- ditions as well as great skill and ex- perience in the designing, building and manning of ships.