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0 ea ae eT TS SF ‘Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law — Specially Compiled for Marine Review HEN a vessel is leaving her dock she gives notice thereof, if she performs her duty, by a long blast of her whistle, and knowledge that the vessel is about to leave dock or is maneuvering preparatory to getting on her course has usually been held ground for application of the special circumstance rule 27.—Ciry or CAM- pEN, 44 F. (2d) 711. 88 HERE charter and bills of lad- ing are silent as to what would constitute delivery, proof of the cus- tom and usage of the port was proper- ly permitted.—Richardson & Sons, Ltd., v. Jenkins Steamship Co., 44 F. (2d) 759. * * % HE neglect contemplated by law exempting a ship owner from loss to cargo by fire is the ship owner’s own personal neglect; it is not that of an agent, employe, or servant of the shipowner. Failure to provide a sea- worthy vessel or competent crew is the personal neglect of the shipowner, and debars him from benefit of such law.—Charbonnier v. United States 45 F. (2d) 166. * * & ees consenting to a longer voy- age than that for which they con- tracted, and receiving pay without de- lay, held not entitled to penalty under section 4529 of the revised statutes of the United States respecting time for paying wages.—CaARIBBEAN, 45 F. (2d) 245. * £¢ & TUG having a vessel approaching on a crossing course on starboard was under the duty to keep out of the way, and inexcusable failure to do so constituted negligence. A privileged vessel, though bound to act prudently, which, of course, includes both the kind and time of action, to avoid col- lision, even though the burdened ves- sel was at fault, had the right to be- lieve that the burdened vessel would comply with the rule and to act ac- cordingly in keeping her own course and speed until she had notice that the burdened vessel was trying to go ahead of her—Frep B. Datzetn, Jr., 45 F. (2d) 580. ke * om AL. in the hold of a vessel assisting in unloading sugar was a seaman within the Federal Em- ployers’ Liability act, it was held in the case of American Sugar Refining Co. v. Nassif, 45 F. (2d) 321. Quoted the court: “We cannot believe that congress willingly would have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to vary with the accident of their being employed by a stevedore rather than by the 38 ship. The policy of the statute is di- rected to the safety of the men and to treating compensation for injuries to them as properly part of the cost of the business. If they should be pro- tected in the one case they should be in the other. In view of the broad field in which congress has disap- proved and changed the rule intro- duced into the common law within less than a century, we are of the opinion that a wider scope should be given to the words of the act, and that in this statute ‘seaman’ is to be taken to include stevedores employed in maritime work on navigable waters as the plaintiff was, whatever it might mean in laws of a different kind.” * * * HE bargee is the agent of the owner charged with taking care of the lines of the vessel. The duty, as be- tween barge owner and consignee, to get out proper lines rests on the own- er, and failure of the bargee to per- form that duty constitutes negligence. —BaArRTLE Daty, 45 F. (2d) 603. * * * eee of any barge to carry an anchor is a statutory fault, it was said in the case of BarTLEeE Daty, 45 F. (2d) 605, and each barge, or its owner, is subject to the same liability that. would have been imposed had an an- chor been carried and not used. The failure to drop an anchor would, how- ever, only be a fault if the use of anchor would have done any good, be- cause only in that event would the fail- ure to act have contributed to the injury. * Eo * ALS the overtaking vessel in the Neches river, a few miles below Beaumont, Texas, was the bur- dened vessel, and though assent to be- ing passed is not tantamount to an assurance by the overtaken vessel of the safety of the attempted maneuver, nevertheless the overtaken vessel has a duty of her own to perform in the first instance which is a condition precedent to her. being absolved from liability, which duty, it was held in the case of VARANGER v. DorA Weems, 45 F. (2d) 608, is that she must not acquiesce in a desire on the part of the overtaking vessel to pass if her (the overtaken vessel’s) pilot or master actually knows, or has reasonable cause to be- lieve, that such passing is fraught with positive danger to either or both vessels. In the same case it was de- clared that river and harbor pilots are chargeable with a high standard of skill and care in navigation, and that even though their services as pilots. be compulsory upon the vessel, their neg- ligence is nevertheless imputed to the vessel; and, further, that a vessel MARINE REVIEw—September, 1931 which accepts an unwise signal does not thereby excuse the other vessel from fault if the dangerous maneuver results in an accident. It is impor- tant to bear in mind always, said the court, the vital distinction between mere difficulty and actual danger. No master or pilot, whether he be in charge of a favored or burdened ves- sel, has a right to acquiesce in a man- euver which he knows is inherently so dangerous that it is not likely to be accomplished with safety to both ves- sels. He may acquiesce, however, if the maneuver can, in his judgment, be accomplished with safety to both ves- sels, although to do so will require an unusually high degree of skill. *% * N ORDER to render a tug liable for loss of barge and cargo, the libelant must show not merely an error of judgment on the part of the navigator, but the lack of that degree of prudence that one having ordinary maritime skill and experience would have exer- cised under the circumstances. But it is obvious, it was observed in the case of A. L. WALKER, 45 F. (2d) 621, that in the case of a tug burdened with three barges on a coastwise voyage, one having ordinary maritime skill and experience would give heed to all available sources of information as to weather conditions, including not only those discernible by the navigators of the tug, but also the radio, the bulle- tins, and signals of the United States weather bureau and the barometric readings. * * * It is well established that a con- tract enforceable in admiralty must be wholly maritime. * * The rule that a contract, to be maritime, and therefore within admiralty jurisdiction, must be “wholly maritime,” means that ‘the principal subject matter of agreement gives character to the whole.—NAVIGA- poRA No. 73, 45 F (2d) 639. ie cae we F A TUG asks a tow to depart from statutory rule for the convenience of the tug and those in charge of the barge acquiesce, both vessels are re- sponsible for resultant damage not clearly shown to have been due to causes independent of such statutory fault.—AsFALTO, 45 F. (2d) 857. * * * HERE the fault of one vessel is glaring, the fault of the other vessel will be closely scrutinized be- fore she is herself held at fault. In the instant case the privileged vessel was held at fault in not reversing immedi- ately on checking speed because the burdened vessel continued on course without answering signals——BENGAL- LA, 45 F. (2d) 864.