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a strong German force was engaged in a somewhat similar undertaking when powerful enemy vesselS were en- countered. The German squadron, consisting of three battle cruisers, an armored cruiser, four light cruisers and 19 destroyers, had gone to the Dogger bank to clear the area of Brit- ish light craft. At the time, Beatty was approaching these waters with five battle cruisers, seven light cruis- ers and 85 destroyers. Contact be- tween light cruisers of the two forces was made at about 7 a.m. on Jan. 24. Thereupon the German force turned toward home in an effort to escape. The action which ensued was a stern chase in which the light craft of both sides took practically no part. The British battle cruisers by virtue of their superior speed were able to close the distance slowly so that by about 9 o’clock the rear ship of the German line, the armored cruiser BLUCHER, came within range of Lion’s guns at 20,000 yards. Soon thereafter the Ger- man battle cruisers came within range also. Their fire was directed mainly at Lion, and she suffered such severe injuries that she was almost de- stroyed. An ammunition fire, which followed a hit forward, reached the handling room and destruction of the ship was averted only by the flooding of magazines. Another serious hit amidships damaged the port condenser and caused the ship to lose speed. It was necessary to take her in tow after the action. Of the German battle cruisers, the SEYDLITZ only was badly damaged. A shell pierced her after barbette and the ensuing ammunition fire burned out both of the after turrets. Maga- zines were flooded in time to prevent an explosion. The relatively weak BiucHrr fared badly. Her protective decks were pen- etrated by long range shell fire and her already moderate speed was so im- paired that she fell back under the concentrated fire of British battle cruisers. Finally she capsized after having offered very stubborn re- sistance for over three hours. Conclusion Drawn from Battle A number of interesting conclusions may be drawn from the events of the battle of Dogger bank. In the first place, the superior speed of the British battle cruisers enabled them to enforce action and to destroy an enemy ship of inferior type. On the other hand, it did not prevent the slower enemy battle cruisers from making good their es- cape. The action demonstrated that battle cruisers engaged on reconnais- sance or independent missions must be prepared to meet powerful enemy ships perhaps in superior strength. It did not demonstrate conclusively that the relatively heavy protection of the Ger- man battle cruisers was an important advantage, for one ship on each side sustained serious injuries as a result of gun fire. One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the British 10 ships had superiority in numbers of five to three (not counting BLUCHER) and that they had an even greater superiority in gun power. The great range at which the ac- tion began and the penetration of BLUCHER’S decks by plunging shell in- dicated the growing importance of deck protection and the necessity of designing turrets for high elevation of guns. The ammunition fires in han- dling rooms of Lion and SEyYDLITZ showed the importance of good pro- tection on turrets and barbettes, and the necessity of devices to prevent the spread of flames to magazines. Great Fleet Action at Jutland It remained for the great fleet action at Jutland to demonstrate additional functions of the battle cruiser. Be- fore contact was made the British and German battle fleets were at sea off the Danish coast in almost full strength. Apparently neither suspected that it was in close proximity to the other. Each had a squadron of battle cruisers far out in advance as a power- ful scouting line able to sweep aside any weak enemy vessels and to pene- trate to within a short distance of enemy ships of corresponding strength. Both squadrons were accompanied by screens of light cruisers and destroy- ers. It is clear that work of this kind demands high speed and great offen- sive and defensive power on the part of the battle cruisers. Contact between the two squadrons was made by light cruisers. -Von Hip- per, the German commander, turned to the southeast toward his battle fleet, which was some 40 miles away. Beatty took up a nearly parallel course and with his superior speed drew slowly ahead apparently with the idea of cutting off the enemy cruisers from return to their home base. On paper the British force looked to be the stronger. It contained six battle cruisers to five for the enemy and it enjoyed. superiority in speed and in caliber of guns. Moreover, there were four battleships of the QUEEN ELIzA- BETH Class only five miles astern. These ships made 25 knots and were in fact better fitted for the duties of battle cruisers than were any other vessels under Beatty’s command. Time was pressing, however, and the fight was on with the QUEEN ELIZABETHS left to catch up if they could. On the famous run to the south- ward, Beatty’s high hopes were shat- tered. Two of his six ships blew up as a result of magazine explosions, while a third, his flagship Lion, almost met the same fate. She was saved only by the heroism of the mortally wound- ed officer of the waist turret. This officer had the presence of mind to have the magazine flooded when an ammunition fire was raging in his tur- ret. While all of this destruction was taking place the German cruisers were not suffering much. All of them reached the end of the run in good condition after about an hour of in- MARINE. REVIEwW—January, 1935 tensive fighting at ranges of 12,600 to 20,900 yards. Their 11 and and 12- inch guns had done great service against the 12 and 13%-inch guns of the British. Toward the end of the run to the southward a diversion took place in the shape of a destroyer at- tack, launched simultaneously by both sides, Secondary batteries were called into play on English and German bat- tle cruisers. The first phase of the battle ended with the approach of the German battle fleet. Beatty turned off to the northward, and he was fol- lowed in this maneuver by Von Hip- per, whose ships formed a line in the van of the battle fleet. Second Phase of the Battle The second phase of the battle was a similar run to the northward. Here the Germans did not fare so well, for the formidable QUEEN ELIZABETHS had tailed in astern of Beatty. They proved to be more than a match for the Ger- man battle cruisers, all of which suf- fered badly. Ranges were somewhat greater than they had been during the first phase of the Battle. In fact they were at times too great for effective reply by Von Hipper’s ships. Beatty’s four remaining battle cruisers did not take an active part in this stage of the engagement. They drew. well ahead and then bore off to the east- ward to take station in the van of Jellicoe’s battle fleet, which by this time had arrived. Beatty effected juncture with three battle cruisers un- der Hood. The latter ships had been stationed in Jellicoe’s screen whence they had been sent ahead to join Beatty. The arrival of Jellico and the de- ployment of his ships into line ahead on an easterly course ended the sec- ond phase of the battle. The long British battle line with seven battle cruisers in its van was now in a po- sition to envelop the entire German fleet, which had been forced to alter course to the eastward to parallel Jellicoe. Von Hipper was still at the head of the German line and his ships were coming under the fire of the British battleships and battle cruisers at short ranges. The opposing battle cruisers engaged in a particularly vio- lent action, in which the INVINCIBLE, Hood’s flagship, blew up due to mag- azine explosion. During the interval of about two hours and a half from the start of the battle to the destruction of the INVINCIBLE, the German battle cruisers had been heavily engaged by capital ships, some of which mounted guns as large as 15 inches in caliber. The position of the German fleet was becoming desperate for Jellicoe’s bat- tle line was working around to the southeast in an enveloping movement. In this difficult situation Von Scheer, German commander-in-chief, launched a destroyer attack as a diversion and then left Von Hipper to cover the counter march and retreat of the Ger- (Continued on Page 26)